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ABSTRACT 
Fundamentally, entrepreneurship is about acting under uncertainty. For 
entrepreneurial firms willing to bear the risks of developing novel innovations from new 
technology knowledge, that uncertainty is amplified. To succeed at launching innovations 
that could bring industry and technology change, these firms need significant resources, 
time, and technology development, but they are weak, under-resourced, and dependent on 
funders and partners to survive. Entrepreneurial firms are theorized and advised to be 
flexible, unencumbered by the organizational inertia that limits their established 
counterparts and therefore able to adapt. Yet, we understand little about how these firms 
manage the uncertainties they face. In this dissertation, I explore how and why 
entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology evolve their strategies and technology 
products. 
The research study for this dissertation is a multi-year longitudinal field study of 
strategy and technology product evolution at seven early stage energy and cleantech 
hardware firms. In the first paper, I examine when and how entrepreneurial firms decide 
to make strategic change and when that change constitutes a ‘pivot’. In the second paper, 
I examine how entrepreneurial technology firms in a dynamic and uncertain context learn 
  vii 
from the process of choosing not to change their strategies. Lastly, in the third paper, I 
examine how these entrepreneurial firms manage the challenges of partnering with 
established firms to develop their novel technologies. This dissertation contributes to the 
entrepreneurship, strategy, and technology innovation literatures with a grounded 
theoretical understanding how early stage technology firms manage uncertainty through 
strategic change, learning, and interorganizational relationships.  
  viii 
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INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is about acting under uncertainty (McMullen and Shepherd 
2006; Loasby 2007; Aldrich and Ruef Forthcoming). For entrepreneurial firms 
developing novel technology innovations, they are acting under even more uncertainty. 
Entrepreneurial technology firms are theorized as flexible, able to adapt to the 
uncertainties they face (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Ambos and Birkinshaw 2010; Gavetti and 
Rivkin 2007). As nascent firms, they are not tied to the existing capabilities (Henderson 
and Clark 1990), cognitive frames (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), social structures (Barley 
1990), or customers (Christensen 1997) that can create barriers to change. Prescriptions 
in both academic (Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf 2014; Murray and Tripsas 2004) and 
practitioner (Blank 2013; Ries 2011) literatures encourage entrepreneurial firms to 
experiment and change their emerging strategies.  
Yet, while entrepreneurial firms have the potential to change, we understand little 
about when they will or what kinds of changes they will make. To create new markets, 
entrepreneurial firms need to not only build a new organization, but also cultivate 
external legitimacy and credibility (Deeds, Mang, and Frandsen 2004); network ties and 
relationships (Hallen 2008); and institutional support (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Navis and 
Glynn 2011). Too many strategy changes can heighten a firm’s instability in the eyes of 
external stakeholders, resource providers, and partners who value coherence and 
continuity. Too few strategy changes can spawn the same rigidities that lead established 
firms to fail in dynamic technological markets. To address this my dissertation asks: How 
and why do entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology evolve their strategies and 
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technology products? 
My research approach relies upon longitudinal field studies of how early stage 
entrepreneurial firms develop new technologies from the lab or theory to new commercial 
markets. Process questions such as this are well addressed through field methods, which 
allow for in depth investigation of a phenomenon whose boundaries are not clearly 
evident beforehand (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2009; Langley 1999; 
Edmondson and Mcmanus 2007). To examine how the context of an entrepreneurial firm 
affects the evolution of strategy and technology, we need to study embryonic and 
emerging firms, not just young firms old enough to be registered in government and 
industry databases (Aldrich and Yang 2012). To understand the processes embryonic 
firms engage in for strategic decision making and change, we need to capture decisions as 
they happen and patterns form (Mintzberg 1979).  
The research study for this dissertation is a longitudinal field study of strategy and 
technology product evolution at seven early stage energy and cleantech hardware firms. 
During five and a half years of data collection, I conducted 112 interviews with founders, 
managers, engineering and other team members, board members, investors, and advisors. 
The bulk of data collection happened between 2012 and 2105, which was the period of 
study originally proposed to the participating firms. After that time, four of the seven 
firms agreed to continue in the study and data collection continued through 2018. 
Additional collected data included onsite observations and firm documents such as board 
presentations and business plans, stakeholder communications, press releases, and news 
stories.  
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The first paper from this study is titled “What is a Pivot? Explaining When and 
How Entrepreneurial Firms Decide to Make Strategic Change and Pivot.” This paper 
examines when and how entrepreneurial firms engaged in innovation decide to make 
strategic change, and when that change constitutes a ‘pivot’. Drawing from the literature 
on strategic change, we defined a pivot as a change in a firm’s strategy that reorients the 
firm’s strategic direction through a reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, 
and attention. From analysis of 93 strategic decisions at risk for change, we found that 
firms rarely chose to change their strategies. When a firm made a decision to change, 
they made a choice to either exit or add an element to their strategy rather than 
completely reorient the firm’s strategic direction. When confronted with new information 
triggers that interrupted the firm’s planned activities, decision makers considered 
strategic change. Firms experienced two types of triggers: problems and opportunities. 
Most often, decision makers retained their beliefs without altering their strategy and 
rejected the option to make a strategic change. Only about one fifth of the time did 
decision makers choose to make a strategic change. When they chose strategic change, 
they either found their beliefs in conflict with a problem trigger and chose a strategic exit 
or embraced an opportunity trigger, expanded their beliefs, and chose a strategic addition. 
A pivot did not occur as the product of one strategic change decision. When pivots 
occurred, they unfolded over time as a product of the accumulation of a series of 
independently triggered strategic decisions. 
The second paper is titled “Keep Learning & Carry On: How Entrepreneurial 
Firms Learn While Choosing Not to Change Strategy.” This paper examines how 
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entrepreneurial technology firms in a dynamic and uncertain context learn from and 
during the process of choosing not to change their strategy.  Entrepreneurial technology 
firms must make decisions and choose their strategies based on incomplete knowledge, a 
mix of accepted information and believed assumptions about which they must continually 
learn to improve their decision making. Despite a focus on change outcomes in 
entrepreneurship research as well as research on organizational learning, I found that for 
80 out of 101 decisions at risk for change, the firms learned and improved their 
knowledge from the process of decision making and with that learning chose not to 
change their strategies. I found that firms moved through three phases: first, firms acquire 
new knowledge about the uncertainties they face; second, they use that learning to 
appraise their current strategy and activities; and third, they determine how best to carry 
the firm forward without changing their strategy. In learning, they improved the accuracy 
of their knowledge, added details, and found support or opposition to their believed 
assumptions. They then used that learning to clarify their goals, reassess tradeoffs, and 
refine their assumptions. From this, they decided between several ways to not change 
their strategy by abstaining from change, time shifting the current strategy, or adjusting to 
reinforce the current strategy. 
The third paper is titled “Navigating Misalignment: How Entrepreneurial Firms 
Manage the Challenges of Partnering with Established Firms.” Through an inductive 
examination of five entrepreneurial-established firm partnerships involving three early 
stage entrepreneurial technology firms, this paper examines how entrepreneurial firms 
manage the challenges of partnering with established firms to develop novel innovations 
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from new technology knowledge. Entrepreneurial firms developing new knowledge to 
create or disrupt markets can mitigate some of the uncertainty they face through 
partnerships with established firms. However, while the entrepreneurial firms bring the 
linchpin technology content to these partnerships, they still need to manage a partnership 
under high uncertainty from a position of low power. I found that when designing their 
partnership contracts, the firms structured an option value arrangement that addressed 
each firm’s key concerns: misappropriation of IP for the entrepreneurial firm and risk for 
the established firm. The established firm provided financial resources in return for a 
future option value of first mover exclusivity with the technology but no equity, while the 
entrepreneurial firm retained full ownership and control of the technology development. 
During the partnership, when the established firm took actions that challenged success, 
the entrepreneurial firm managed those challenges by using one or more of four 
strategies: 1) wait, 2) explore outside options, 3) resolve specific challenge content, and 
4) address the established firm’s motivations. The result of these managing strategies was 
either that the established firm realigned its commitment to the partnership or the 
entrepreneurial firm terminated the relationship. This research contributes to the 
entrepreneurship and alliances literature a deeper understanding of how entrepreneurial-
established firm partnerships are executed in addition to how they are structured, as well 
as the actions and power of the entrepreneurial firm in asymmetrical relationships. 
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WHAT IS A PIVOT? EXPLAINING WHEN AND HOW ENTREPRENEURIAL 
FIRMS DECIDE TO MAKE STRATEGIC CHANGE AND PIVOT 
 
Stewart Butterfield, the boss of Slack, a messaging company, has been 
wonderfully unlucky in certain ventures. In 2002 he and a band of colleagues 
created an online-video game called “Game Neverending”. It never took off, but 
the tools they used to design it turned into Flickr, the web’s first popular photo-
sharing website. Yahoo bought it in 2005 for a reported $35M. Four years later 
Mr. Butterfield tried to create another online game, called Glitch. It flopped as 
well. But Mr. Butterfield and his team developed an internal messaging system 
to collaborate on it, which became the basis for Slack. In Silicon Valley, such a 
change in strategy is called a “pivot”; anywhere else it is called good fortune. 
(Economist 2016) 
 
Slack is a poster child for the term “pivot” – an innovative entrepreneurial 
technology firm founded to build one product but, after that failed, changed its product, 
collected $540M in funding, and achieved a valuation of $3.8B (Economist 2016). With 
examples like these, it is no wonder that entrepreneurs have embraced the word “pivot” 
as strategic action that leverages a firm’s technology innovations, adapts them for new 
markets, and enables the firm to survive, like a phoenix from the ashes. The term “pivot” 
entered the entrepreneurial lexicon and the business school classroom with the Lean 
Startup methodology and the work of entrepreneur practitioner authors such as Eric Reis 
and Steve Blank (Ries 2011; Blank 2013). In their eyes, a pivot is a substantial change 
made after customer feedback reveals that a firm’s business hypotheses are incorrect. 
Entrepreneurs and the popular press have since embraced the term “pivot”, without 
consistency and with scant attention to the scholarly literature on strategic change, to 
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describe nearly any strategic shift made by a firm, a person, or even a government1.  
One explanation for this disconnect is that scholars of strategic change have 
primarily devoted their attention to how mature firms make strategic change to refresh or 
renew established strategies (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; 
Williams, Chen, and Agarwal 2017) with less attention to how entrepreneurial firms 
make changes to nascent strategies. Much scholarship suggests that mature firms are 
motivated to make a strategic change when they perceive a performance gap between a 
firm’s target and expected performance (Cyert and March 1963; Levitt and March 1988). 
However, entrepreneurial firms must decide whether to change their strategy without 
extensive firm history or discrete points of comparison, and must make sense of either 
thin or ambiguous data, especially when engaged in innovation (e.g. Joseph and Gaba 
2015). The strategic change literature tends to examine how firms either do or do not 
change their strategies in response to the introduction of technological innovations 
developed by others (Christensen 1997; Henderson 1993; Tripsas 1997b; Gilbert 2005; 
Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). How firms in the process of developing technology 
innovations make the choice to change their strategies is less understood. Product 
development in any context is “thoroughly infused with uncertainty” (Coase and Wang 
2011), and entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology innovations may encounter 
previously unknown technology constraints that completely alter what the firm can build 
                                               
1 An online search for the term “pivot” of business magazines and newspapers such as Forbes, Inc., 
The Economist, and The New York Times returns article titles such as: “Millennial News Site Mic 
Lays Off 25 Employees In 'Pivot' To Video” “Pivots Are For Leadership -- Not Just Strategy” 
“Republicans Pivot and Make Comey the Capitol's Most-Wanted Man” “7 Signs You Are Ready For 
A Work-Life Pivot” 
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and market. Firms know that their strategies include untested beliefs that could later 
prove to be inaccurate – they just did not know which ones would prove false. Packard, 
Clark, and Klein (2017) consider this to be “absolute uncertainty” where entrepreneurs 
face unlimited options and the “possible outcomes are unknown and unknowable” (2017: 
845). Under these conditions, establishing a gap between target and expected 
performance may be less relevant to explaining when and how entrepreneurial firms 
decide to change or pivot their strategies. 
To address this gap, theories of strategic change need to explain how change 
decisions are made when firms are engaged in the process of developing new innovations 
– before comparable performance targets can be established. Entrepreneurs like 
Butterfield, who are attempting to create novel technology, frequently encounter new 
information which may trigger them to consider strategic change prior to the opportunity 
to receive feedback on the firm’s performance. Unfortunately, when and how 
entrepreneurial strategies change are rarely captured in commonly available datasets and 
are less accessible for scholars to study (Aldrich and Yang 2012). Thus, with a 
longitudinal field study of seven early stage energy and cleantech hardware firms 
developing new technology innovations, we examined when and how decision makers 
decided to make strategic change. Through periodic interactions over a one to three year 
period, we interviewed and observed founders and team members regarding decisions 
that affected the fundamental definition and core processes of their firms to obtain the full 
set of strategic decisions at risk for change. This approach permitted equitable treatment 
of the decision to either select or reject strategic change.  
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From our analysis of 93 strategic decisions at risk for change, pooled from the 
seven firms we studied, we found that, in contrast with the popular press’s preoccupation 
with pivots, firms rarely chose to change their strategies. When a firm made a decision to 
change, they made a choice to either exit or add an element to their strategy rather than to 
completely reorient the firm’s strategic direction. On their own, these types of strategic 
change decisions did not produce the type of “pivot” Mr. Butterfield accomplished when 
he transitioned his firm from the video game Glitch to the internal messaging application 
Slack. Drawing from our data and the literature on strategic change (Agarwal and Helfat 
2009; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; Gioia et al. 1994; Van de Ven and Poole 1995), 
we defined a pivot as a change in a firm’s strategy that reorients the firm’s strategic 
direction through a reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, and attention. 
Ultimately, three out of seven firms experienced a pivot during our time of study. Rather 
than make a single decision to pivot their strategy, these firms made several decisions 
that cumulatively reoriented the firm’s strategic direction and produced a pivot. 
Revisiting each firm’s case, we identify a grounded theoretical model to explain the 
conditions under which entrepreneurial firms developing technology innovations pivot. In 
doing so, we contribute an explanation of strategic change that takes the entrepreneurial 
process of innovation into account.  
Strategic Change and Innovation 
Strategic change and strategic renewal are often used interchangeably in the 
literature (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997) but most often scholars refer to strategic 
renewal as "the process, content and outcome of refreshment or replacement of attributes 
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of an organization that have the potential to substantially affect its long-term prospects" 
(Agarwal and Helfat 2009: 282). Research on strategic renewal typically examines what 
drives or inhibits mature firms from renewing their strategies in response to shifts in their 
industry and environment (e.g. Dutton and Duncan 1987; Zajac and Kraatz 1993; Kaplan 
2008a). While offering robust explanations for the rigidities and cognitive barriers that 
plague mature firms from adopting or executing on strategic changes in a timely fashion 
(e.g. Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Barr, Stimpert, and Huff 1992; Henderson 1993), our 
understanding of strategic change in entrepreneurial firms faces three limitations.  
First, the strategic change literature theorizes that firms are motivated to change 
when they perceive a performance gap: when new information illuminates a gap between 
a firm’s target outcome and its expected performance (Cyert and March 1963; Levitt and 
March 1988). Whether the perceived performance gap is aspirational, identifying an 
opportunity for improvement, or negative, forewarning plunging revenues, the theory 
asserts that firm decision makers compare the firm’s current performance with these two 
different estimations of performance outcome. However, since firms can amass volumes 
of data that illicit conflicting interpretations (Daft and Weick 1984; Maitlis and 
Christianson 2014), it is unlikely that such comparisons are so cleanly determined. 
Recently, Joseph and Gaba (2015) showed that the ambiguity of performance feedback, 
its inconsistency across multiple sources and interpretations delayed both decision 
making and action as firms made sense of new information that was continually evolving. 
Identifying clear, concrete outcomes to compare a firm’s performance in relation to its 
business environment is not easily done for any firm, but this is particularly true for 
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entrepreneurial firms bringing new technology to the world that may not have a strong 
trajectory of performance to form a basis for comparison.  
Second, examination of strategic change often assumes that strategic renewal was 
the correct and necessary decision for those firms at that time, rather than evaluate what 
prompted the decisions to select or reject change contemporaneously. For example, Barr, 
Stimpert, and Huff (1992)  define the opposite of strategic renewal as strategic decline. 
This perspective views strategic change as a necessary reaction to a firm’s environment: 
"a difference in the form, quality, or state over time (Van de Ven and Poole 1995) in an 
organization's alignment with its external environment" (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997: 
49).These studies often operate with the benefit of hindsight, starting with the assumption 
that strategic change was the correct choice for the firm and examine how firms failed to 
perceive or act on this information (e.g. Christensen 1997; Christensen and Bower 1996). 
Gauging the appropriateness of strategic change for entrepreneurial firms may be more 
difficult to determine given the untested nature of their initial strategies (McMullen 
2015).  
Third, the focus within the strategic change and renewal literature has been on 
firms’ reaction to exogenous shifts (Dutton and Duncan 1987) such as changes in 
regulations (e.g. Barr 1998); technology (e.g. Christensen 1997; Gilbert 2005; Tripsas 
1997b); or market preferences (e.g. Zajac and Kraatz 1993). For example, studies have 
examined why a focal firm did or did not change its strategy in the face of new 
innovations made by competitors (e.g. Gilbert 2005; Bower and Christensen 1995; 
Tripsas 1997b). While important for understanding strategic renewal in mature firms, this 
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research does not explain how entrepreneurial firms make decisions about strategic 
change when developing new innovations. When developing new innovations, 
discoveries can pose both favorable and unfavorable impacts to the firm, prompting firms 
to consider strategic change prior to gaining information on firm performance. In this 
context, the choice to change strategy may not be a reaction to the innovations of others, 
but triggered by emerging discoveries revealed during a firm’s own innovation process. 
For example, after Raytheon engineer Perry Spencer figured out why candy bars melted 
in his pocket while he worked with the microwave magnetron, Raytheon expanded its 
strategy of being a WWII era military electronics supplier to create a civilian food 
appliance division, introducing microwave popcorn to the world (Ackerman 2016).  
In short, research on strategic change tends to evaluate how established firms 
respond to innovations introduced by other firms rather than by examining how 
opportunities for strategic change emerge in the process of developing new innovations. 
The study of established firms reacting to exogenous change starts from the position of 
mature firms that have previously achieved strategic alignment with their environment 
and have a track record of performance. When and how strategic change happens at 
entrepreneurial firms, whose strategies are still forming (Ott, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 
2017) as they develop novel technologies that could initiate later industry shifts is less 
understood. Entrepreneurial firms in the process of developing novel innovations, face 
many uncertainties as they transition from ideas to concepts to marketable products and 
services (e.g. Packard, Clark, and Klein 2017). Firms pursuing a ‘strategizing by doing’ 
approach act with the explicit intent to learn and change their strategies as experience fills 
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in what they could not have known with full information ahead of time (Ott, Eisenhardt, 
and Bingham 2017). Firms pursuing a ‘strategizing by thinking’ approach use mental 
models and analogies as proxies for ambiguous or uncertain information about their 
futures, still aware that those cognitive tools may need to be revised as the future unfolds 
(Ott, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2017). As unknown information is revealed, firms may 
update not only their beliefs and assumptions, but also their strategies, well in advance of 
achieving strategic alignment or perceiving a performance gap. 
Fundamentally, the challenge for entrepreneurial firms in deciding when to 
change their strategy is not about renewing a tested and previously successful strategy, 
but about whether and how to change a strategy that is still forming while engaged in the 
process of innovation. Before firms have developed their innovations, they cannot receive 
feedback on their strategies or compare performance expectations to prior experience. 
However, they will identify new information throughout the innovation process that can 
trigger decision makers to consider changing the firm’s strategies. In the early, dynamic 
process of strategy formation, the artifacts and measures traditionally used to examine 
when and how firms make strategic changes, such as annual reports, budget breakdowns, 
and formal titles (e.g. Romanelli and Tushman 1994; Kaplan 2008a) may not yet exist or 
be publicly available. To examine when and how early stage entrepreneurial firms 
developing new technology innovations decide to make strategic change, what is needed 
is contemporaneous examination of the stream of decisions entrepreneurial firms make in 
their earliest stages (Mintzberg 1978). Rather than selecting on strategic change, what is 
needed is an approach that identifies strategic decisions at risk for change in order treat 
  
14 
the possibility of stasis and change equally. Only by doing so can we develop an 
understanding of the conditions that prompt decision makers to either select or reject 
strategic change. 
Research Methods 
Qualitative field methods are appropriate for this study as they allow for in depth 
investigation of a phenomenon whose boundaries are not clearly evident in advance 
(Langley 1999; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Bettis et al. 2015). Longitudinal, real-time 
field research can provide the full set of choices managers face without ex ante filtering 
(Van de Ven 1992). Thus, we used a longitudinal, qualitative field study to examine the 
antecedents or triggers to strategic decisions at seven early stage entrepreneurial firms 
developing hardware in the energy and cleantech sector. We investigated the events that 
prompted strategic decision making and traced when decision makers selected or rejected 
strategic change. We probed entrepreneurs and their teams about recent and under 
consideration strategic decisions that informants deemed to be “impactful” to the strategy 
of the firm. By examining the decision making process for the full set of decisions at risk 
for strategic change, we identified when firms considered and rejected strategic change as 
well as when firms opted to change their strategy. We then analyzed the types of strategic 
change selected by each firm to understand the conditions that produced a pivot or 
strategic reorientation. 
Research setting: energy & cleantech hardware 
We selected seven entrepreneurial firms pioneering new hardware technology in 
the energy & cleantech sector because this is a sector fraught with uncertainty that can 
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affect firm strategy in its earliest stages. Many firms in this sector are developing 
revolutionary technology innovations to address global issues of energy efficiency, 
sustainability, pollution, and energy generation (Mowery, Nelson, and Martin 2010). 
New technology entrants aim to either replace existing technologies, supplant mature 
firms, or create new product categories. While developing their novel technology 
products, pioneering firms cannot know in advance which new technologies will be 
preferred by the market (Grodal, Gotsopoulos, and Suarez 2015). Energy and cleantech 
technologies often require significant capital and long development cycles which can be 
extended by industry regulation or politics (e.g. Guo 2014). Recent high profile failures 
involving federal loans have hurt the reputation of the sector in the eyes of investors and 
decreased their willingness to participate (Hargadon and Kenney 2012; Mowery, Nelson, 
and Martin 2010), increasing uncertainty as to whether funding will be available to reach 
the next milestone (e.g. Gompers 1995). All firms in this context face heightened 
uncertainty as new information about technology, regulations, and available financial 
resources throughout the sector are subject to constant change.  
Theoretically driven sample design  
We employed a theoretical rather than representative sampling by selecting 
entrepreneurial firms based on characteristics that provide the opportunity to extend 
relationships and logic among constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 27).  
Entrepreneurial hardware firms were theoretically desirable for three reasons. First, they 
are understudied relative to software firms. Second, hardware firms face significant 
uncertainties. Hardware development involves integrating new and extant systems, and 
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only by doing so, can previously unknown limits in both old and new technologies be 
discovered. Scaling hardware designs for production, volume, or full size products can 
introduce previously unknown technical and manufacturing problems that can be difficult 
or costly to change at a later date due to tightly structured core architectures (e.g. Clark 
1985). Third, in this setting, the decision to change strategy will be explicit and 
observable to the researcher. While software developers can instantly identify whether 
the code developed will compile to create a coherent build, tracing these moments can be 
difficult for a researcher. In the case of hardware, it will be very clear to the researcher if 
lab tests or prototypes function as intended. 
Firms were selected into the sample based on two criteria. First, we chose firms 
that were pre-sales at the time of entry into the study as sales represent a contractual 
commitment in the definition of a product’s form, features, market, pricing, and supply 
chain that are difficult to reverse. By selecting entrepreneurial hardware firms prior to 
committing to a particular market strategy, we were better able to gauge entrepreneurial 
strategy in its formative stages increasing the opportunity to observe strategic shifts (Ott, 
Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2017). 
Second, each firm employed at least three people at the time of entry into the 
study. Additional staff commits the founder to the firm’s success and serves as an 
indicator that the entrepreneur has escalated from a lone inventor to a business venture, 
since additional team members require organizational structure and resources. From the 
researcher’s perspective, teams of three or more members provide more varied vantages 
into the strategy decision making process as their presence requires the founding 
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entrepreneur to articulate strategic goals and decisions explicitly to the team. The seven 
firm sample was compiled through introductions made by the researchers’ university 
network of entrepreneurs. All firms were located in the Boston metropolitan area at the 
time of entry to the study. Founders were approached by email or in person and asked to 
participate in a field based research study on how entrepreneurial firms in nascent 
technology industries navigate strategic change. Additionally, they were told that each 
firm would be kept unidentifiable in presentation and publication of the research. To this 
end, all firm and informant names presented are pseudonyms and details about the 
technologies and products under development are disguised.  
All seven firms were founded to commercialize a novel technology hardware and 
create a new market or replace an existing technology. This sample of firms founded 
between 2007 and 2013 includes a variety of technologies within the energy and 
cleantech sector such as power generation and storage (Coulomb, Farad, Gauss); energy 
efficiency improvements of electrical systems (Joule, Ohm); and pollution (Ergon, 
Hartree). All firm founders had educations and backgrounds in engineering: three with 
prior startup experience and four recently graduated students.  Table 1 provides an 
overview of the firms at entry to this study.  
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Firm Founded Team Technology Founder experience 
Coulomb 2009 4+ Manufacturing 
process 
2 engineering consultants & 1 engineering 
professor 
Ergon 2010 8 Chemical process 2 serial entrepreneur engineers 
Farad 2013 4 Stand-alone Product 2 former CTOs from related industry startups 
Gauss 2011 4+ Stand-alone Product 2 engineering students 
Hartree 2007 15 Chemical process 1 experienced engineer entrepreneur 
Joule 2011 7 Component 2 engineering graduates 
Ohm 2010 10+ Component 3 engineering graduates & 1 MBA 
+ Additional advisors, interns, consultants, or university labs not included in this count. 
Table 1: Case descriptives at entry to research study 
Data collection 
We conducted 82 semi-structured interviews during which we probed founders 
and team members about strategic decisions that affected the firm’s strategy. We 
interviewed founding entrepreneurs, the top management team, board members, 
engineers, investors, and other advisors involved in strategic decisions at each firm. 
Introductory interviews began with the informant generating a list of strategic decisions 
impactful for the firm. We consider strategic decisions to be related “to the long-term 
prospects of the company” and have a “critical influence on its success or failure” 
(Agarwal and Helfat 2009: 281). During initial interviews, informants were asked to 
discuss as many impactful strategic decisions as time allowed. Follow-up interviews 
explored how previously identified strategic decisions evolved as well as new strategic 
decisions that had since emerged. Interviews averaged 70 minutes in length and all 
interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
Interviews were conducted over a one to three-year period (depending on firm 
entry to the study) to capture the evolution of firm strategy while decisions and 
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recollections were contemporary. Firms entered the study at different times between the 
second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2015. Two firms (Gauss and Ohm) entered 
the study a year earlier than the other firms as a pilot to test the research design. Figure 1 
shows how these data were distributed by type of information at each firm over time. We 
augmented interview data with 48 onsite observations coinciding with interviews held at 
the firms’ offices and 69 internal and external documents, including board presentations, 
articles about the firms and the founders, and stakeholder communications provided by 
informants to confirm the timing of key events. 
 
Figure 1: Interview descriptives 
Data analysis 
Data analysis was a six phase inductive and iterative theory building process. In 
the first phase, we identified 147 strategic decisions from the interview data pooled 
across all seven firms. For example, in several interviews, informants from Coloumb 
discussed whether to target venture capital investment. We coded this as one strategic 
decision. Since our goal was to examine strategic decisions at risk for change, we 
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excluded 46 decisions made as part of founding the firm and forming the initial strategy, 
which could therefore not be considered at risk for change. Of the 101 strategic decisions 
for which change was considered, 93 were completed at the conclusion of data collection. 
These 93 strategic decisions across the seven firms constitute the pooled data set for this 
study and represent the full set of strategic decisions at risk for strategic change. 
In the second phase, we used open coding to identify what stimulated (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Théorêt 1976) or triggered strategic decision making. Drawing upon 
Sonenshein (2009), we identified triggers as new information that interrupted existing 
activities and triggered sensemaking (e.g. Weick 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 
2005). Sonenshein argues that a trigger “causes a fundamental interruption by raising 
questions which spark sensemaking.” We define a trigger as new information that 
interrupts the firm’s planned activities prompting firm decision makers to consider 
strategic change. Increasingly, scholars recognize that sensemaking is critical to 
managers’ recognition of the need for strategic change (Gioia and Thomas 1996; Barr, 
Stimpert, and Huff 1992; Kaplan 2008b). In our case, triggers stimulated decision makers 
to question the firm’s current strategy and consider change.  
To account for varying perspectives, we coded triggers three ways. First, we 
coded triggers by the nature of the information introduced to the decision maker, such as 
technology, market, financing, supply chain, or organizational activities. Second, inspired 
by Gersick (1988) and Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013), we coded triggers temporally by 
development phase or milestone, capturing when triggers to a decision appeared during 
the innovation process. Third, drawing on research about the antecedents (Fiss and Zajac 
  
21 
2006) or catalysts of strategic change (Gilbert 2005; Jackson and Dutton 1988), we coded 
whether triggers presented either a problem or an opportunity, an assessment of 
favorability from the viewpoint of the firm’s decision makers. A problem trigger 
introduced information that posed a potential loss or unfavorable impact to the firm that 
could decrease the firm’s value or increase the likelihood of failure. An opportunity 
trigger introduced information with the potential for gain or a favorable impact that could 
increase the value of the firm, its products, or its chances of success.  
In the third phase, we coded whether decision makers decided to change their 
firm’s strategy for each of the 93 completed decisions. Unlike definitions of strategic 
renewal (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff 1992), we did not assume a priori whether strategic 
change was necessary. Rather, we coded a decision to make a strategic change as a 
decision maker’s explicit choice to deviate from the firm’s existing strategy without 
judgement by the researcher as to whether change was needed. Following Romanelli and 
Tushman (1994); Boeker (1997), and Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011), we 
operationalized a strategic change as a decision to change at least one element of a firm’s 
existing strategy (e.g. a change in product line, market breadth, or partnering strategy). 
We considered firms to reject strategic change if they made no adjustment to their 
allocation or structure of their existing activities, resources, and attention (e.g. Ocasio 
1997) or made only slight adjustments to reinforce their current strategy.   
We found that the firms in our sample were more likely to reject strategic change 
(72/93) than they were to select strategic change (21/93) regardless of the type or timing 
of the trigger encountered. For example, when Gauss’s decision makers chose not to 
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pursue a newly discovered grant opportunity because “it wasn’t in a market segment that 
was our primary market segment,” we considered this a choice to reject the option to 
change their strategy. To understand not just when firms made strategic change but how 
firms changed their strategies, we coded the 21 strategic change choices made and 
identified two types: strategic exits and strategic additions. A strategic exit occurred 
when a firm chose to discontinue a current product without replacement. For example, 
after realizing they could not fit their prototype into its required packaging, let alone the 
suitcase the CEO was taking to the industry’s annual convention, Joule gave up on that 
market and cancelled their only product, leaving the firm with a hole in their strategy. A 
strategic addition occurred when a firm added a new value proposition or set of activities 
not previously included in the strategy. For example, Hartree unexpectedly acquired their 
only competitor when this firm lost its investors, adding new designs to Hartree’s product 
portfolio before Hartree’s own products were ready for commercial production. Six out 
of seven firms chose strategic additions and three out of seven firms selected strategic 
exits during the time of study. Only one firm, Ergon, made no strategic changes. 
In the fourth phase, we mapped different types of triggers with strategic decisions. 
We used tables (Miles and Huberman 1994) to identify patterns between decision triggers 
and strategic decisions. We found no patterns based on the content (technical, market, 
financing, etc.) or the timing of decision triggers. Ultimately, we did find a pattern based 
on the favorability of decision triggers. In contrast with Gilbert (2005), most strategic 
changes were prompted by opportunities rather than problems. Furthermore, only 
opportunities led to strategic additions (16/21) while only problems led to strategic exits 
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(5/21).  
To better understand this pattern, we returned to the data in a fifth phase and 
examined the full set of strategy options and the statements made by decision makers 
about the information and beliefs they considered during each firm’s strategic decision 
making process. We defined a belief as an assertion or conviction that an uncertain or 
unverified statement is or will be true (McMullen and Shepherd 2006). When decision 
makers selected a strategic exit, they stated how the trigger’s new information conflicted 
with one or more of their beliefs about the uncertainty the firm faced. When decision 
makers chose a strategic addition, they restated their beliefs about the uncertainty the firm 
faced, but updated those beliefs using broader language encompassing a more expansive 
strategy.  
Following the logic of Mintzberg (1978) that realized strategy is a pattern in a 
stream of strategic decisions, in the sixth and final phase of analysis, we created timelines 
to analyze each firm’s pattern of decisions over time. By doing so, we developed a 
grounded explanation of how decisions either did or did not accumulate into a strategic 
reorientation or pivot. From this analysis, we contribute a theoretical framework to 
explain when and how which entrepreneurial firms make strategy changes that produce 
pivots.  
When Firms Decide To Change Their Strategy 
When confronted with new information triggers that interrupted the firm’s 
planned activities, decision makers considered strategic change. All firms experienced 
two types of triggers: problems and opportunities during the time of study. Most often, 
  
24 
decision makers retained their beliefs without altering their strategy, and rejected the 
option to make a strategic change. Only about one fifth of the time, did decision makers 
enact a strategic change. When decision makers choose strategic change, they either 
found their beliefs in conflict with a problem trigger and chose a strategic exit or 
embraced an opportunity trigger, expanded their beliefs, and chose a strategic addition. 
Despite the fact that six out of seven firms chose, at least once during the period of study, 
to make a strategic change, only three firms ultimately pivoted, changing their prior 
strategic direction by reallocating and restructuring their activities, resources, and 
attention. However, a pivot did not occur as the product of one strategic change decision. 
When firm decision makers chose to make a strategic change, they changed an element of 
their strategy, but not the overall strategy. When pivots occurred, they unfolded over time 
as a product of the accumulation of a series of independently triggered strategic 
decisions.  
When is a firm’s strategy at risk for change? 
As might be expected with entrepreneurial firms developing new technical 
innovations, the firms in our study continuously identified new information about their 
technology, market, financing, or industry. When the team encountered new information 
that aligned with or confirmed their expectations, the firm continued with its activities 
unaffected. When new information diverged from or challenged their beliefs about their 
firm, technology, or strategy, decision makers’ planned activities became interrupted, 
triggering decision makers to consider whether to change their strategy. In these 
moments, the firm’s strategy became at risk for change.  
  
25 
Content of Trigger. Triggers to strategic decision making varied in the content of 
their information; in their temporal relationship to the firm’s activities; and in the 
favorability of the potential impact to the firm, as seen in Table 2. Some firms 
experienced more triggers that others, but because they were all working on different 
technologies and were at different stages of development, we cannot draw conclusions 
from these differences. A trigger’s content could refer to a firm’s technology, such as 
when Joule’s prototype literally exploded on the lab bench or a firm’s target market, such 
as when Ergon was invited by a potential partner to begin sales in a new nation. A 
trigger’s content most commonly related to financial needs or potential funding sources, 
such as when Ohm’s low bank balance triggered the board to discuss taking on venture 
debt. Triggers could also stem from organizational activities such as when Gauss’ 
leaders’ miscommunication triggered a decision about quarterly and annual, personnel 
and firm target metrics. Finally, new supply chain information could also trigger strategic 
decisions such as when Coulomb’s conversations with potential investors triggered 
decision making about where in the value chain Coulomb should position itself. 
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Type of trigger Coulomb Ergon Farad Gauss Hartree Joule Ohm Total 
Content         
Technology  1  3  11 8 23 
Market  2  5 1 6 3 17 
Financing 4 3 3 5 4 5 6 30 
Supply chain 1 4  2    7 
Organizational activities 1 2  3 2 3 5 16 
         
Timing         
Impending deadline 1 4 2 4 2 9 10 32 
Phase transition 3 5 1 3 3 5 6 26 
Following a prior decision 1   4  5 3 13 
Other 1 3  7 2 6 3 22 
         
Favorability         
Problem 1 3 2 8 1 10 17 42 
Opportunity 5 9 1 10 6 15 5 51 
Total 6 12 3 18 7 25 22 93 
Table 2: Decision making triggers by firm 
 
Timing of Trigger. Triggers emerged at different points in time and could affect 
strategic decision making in multiple ways. For example, new information was often 
identified as a deadline approached or as the firm prepared to transition into a new phase 
of development. As Farad’s need for funding stretched on, potential investors expressed 
that they would like to see a working small scale prototype. This triggered Farad to 
reconsider its strategy not to waste time or resources building “a toy” prototype. As 
Coulomb prepared to transition from component development to building their scale 
prototype, information about the volume and ceiling heights of local commercial 
properties triggered a decision to relocate. New information was also introduced as firms 
managed prior decisions such as when Gauss added a second product to their portfolio 
and then realized they needed to figure out how to fund its marketing and development. 
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Favorability of Trigger. From the perspective of our informants, the new 
information presented by a trigger could pose either a problem or an opportunity for the 
firm’s current strategy. A problem trigger introduced information that posed an 
unfavorable potential impact to the firm, with the possibility to decrease the firm’s value 
or resources or to increase the likelihood of failure. For example, an industry engineer 
talking with Joule’s R&D team at a conference booth educated the team about how their 
target market makes purchase decisions based on one performance indicator: the one 
Joule’s product lagged by a factor of 1,000. An opportunity trigger introduced new 
information with the potential for a favorable impact that could increase the value of the 
firm, its product, or its chances of success. For example, when Ergon discovered that they 
could collect “big data” and monetize it if they developed their own software rather than 
rely on their manufacturing partner as originally planned. All firms experienced on-going 
triggers that prompted decision makers to reevaluate their strategy and initiate decision 
making due to financing, an impending deadline, or a phase transition. All firms 
experienced both problems and opportunities during the time of study. But not all firms 
made changes to their strategies when encountering a trigger.  
When do firms choose strategic change? 
When new information interrupted the firm’s activities and challenged decision 
makers’ beliefs about their current strategy, they were prompted to consider strategic 
change as an option, but this did not mean that firms necessarily chose strategic change. 
With analysis of the full set of strategic decisions at risk for change, we were able to 
obtain an unbiased determination of when firms chose to either select or reject strategic 
  
28 
change. While firms considered strategic change as an option in each of the 93 decisions 
examined, predominantly decision makers chose not to change their strategy, as seen in 
Table 3. In 72 decisions, decision makers maintained their beliefs about their firm, 
technology, and strategy and rejected the option to change despite the new information 
the trigger presented. In 21 decisions, when firms experienced a trigger that conflicted 
with or altered their beliefs, they chose a strategy change.  
 No change Strategic change   
Strategic change 
decisions 72 21  
 
Firms  Exit Addition Total  
Coulomb 5  1 6 
N
o 
pi
vo
t 
Ergon 12   12 
Farad 2  1 3 
Hartree 5  2 7 
Gauss 11 1 6 18 
Pi
vo
te
d 
Joule 19 2 4 25 
Ohm 18 2 2 22 
Total  72 5 16 93  
Table 3: Strategic change decisions by firm 
 
Rejecting strategic change  
Even when confronting triggers that challenged their beliefs about their firm’s 
strategy, most of the time, decision makers at all seven firms, chose not to change their 
strategy (72/93). We considered firms to have rejected strategic change when they made 
no or only very small adjustment to their strategy after considering change. Firms 
rejected change when experiencing every type of trigger. For example, as Ohm 
transitioned between developing prototypes and developing a manufacturable product for 
their first B2B customer, the R&D team identified a technology problem: their current 
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system architecture could not meet some of their customer’s stated requirements. Ohm 
considered changing their strategy, but then rejected that option, instead focusing on a 
technology design that allowed them to appease their customer and continue the product 
launch order they believed optimal.  
In some cases, when firms chose to reject strategic change, they accepted the 
potential negative impact the problem trigger presented. Ergon faced an impending 
supply chain deadline when they learned that Henry, their US manufacturing and 
distribution partner, had not begun the integration work necessary to sell their product. 
CEO Tad David considered several options: wait, find a different partner, or build 
manufacturing and distribution capability internally. Waiting could mean months without 
sales or progress, effectively making the firm subordinate to Henry. While an alternative 
partner might reach the market sooner, no competitor had Henry’s technological or 
market knowledge and reputation, and Ergon’s current team had no manufacturing and 
distribution capabilities. None of their options were appealing. But, David continued to 
believe that partnerships provided speed and savings, and decided that waiting for Henry 
was the best choice regardless of the delay this posed for Ergon. As David stated:  
We always tell ourselves we have the option to transition in-house down the 
road if we want to. We still say that to ourselves. I’d be hard-stretched to 
imagine a situation where we’d want to do that. You would only want to bring 
in-house something where you have a differentiating core competency. If a 
subcontractor can do it anyway then what’s the point of me replicating that in-
house? What strategic advantage does that give me? 
While Ergon’s team claimed to be open to strategic change, they continued to believe that 
partnering was optimal and chose to wait for Henry even if it meant temporarily shutting 
their doors. After this decision, Ergon’s management team identified how long they could 
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wait before having to “hunker down, send all our employees home, or half of them home, 
and just preserve our cash.” Luckily, Henry stepped up within a few months and Ergon 
was back on track. 
While in some cases, firms whole-heartedly declined opportunities, in other cases, 
firms found ways to use an opportunity to retain and reinforce their current strategy 
without making strategic change. They maintained their prior beliefs but used the 
opportunity to improve the potential of the existing strategy. Coulomb faced a financial 
problem trigger leading up to a self-imposed deadline to find R&D funding when a 
government agency announced a multi-million dollar technology grant tailored to 
Coulomb’s product. However, the grant required applicants to submit proposals with 
several partners collaborating across the value chain. CEO Jim Allen had to decide if the 
grant money was worth bringing other firms onto a project that could potentially dilute 
Coloumb’s unique intellectual property, the firm’s core value proposition. The Coulomb 
team believed that securing their competitive position depended on partnering rather than 
competing with other firms across the value chain. However, they also believed that they 
needed to secure their IP to maintain the firm’s value to potential investors. CEO Allen 
considered how to reconcile these beliefs in his decision making process and arrived at a 
different solution that rejected change but rather reinforced Coulomb’s existing strategy:  
This [grant] project is the detailed design of the [whole] operation. The reason 
we pulled in a bunch of partners. Right now, it’s a technical economic exercise 
for everybody but, at the end of the day, we want everyone to have written down 
their scope and the price they want to do it for, and have everyone else agree: 
“That sounds good, we can do that.” 
Allen’s solution shifted the grant project away from IP development, instead bringing a 
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collection of firms together to work out the economics of Coulomb’s new manufacturing 
process and agree on its viability. With the new project definition, Allen reinforced 
Coulomb’s existing strategy, maintaining control over their intellectual property while 
acquiring partners to pursue the grant opportunity. 
Choosing strategic change 
Six out of seven firms chose strategic change, in 21 of the 93 strategic decisions at 
risk for change. When the new information triggering decision making conflicted with or 
expanded the beliefs held by decision makers about the firm, their technology, or their 
strategy, decision makers opted to change some element of the firm’s strategy. For 
example, Ohm identified an opportunity trigger in 2012 when an internal development 
project revealed the potential for an additional product not previously considered. When 
they founded the firm, Ohm’s engineering team believed that their technology could only 
be commercially manufactured as a microchip. After CTO Al Marcone grew concerned 
that their microchip would not be ready for customer and funder demonstrations by the 
deadline needed to support a new funding round, he built a non-microchip prototype from 
“discretes” (off the shelf electronic components). CEO Cam Fahey described how this 
new “discretes” prototype triggered the team to consider whether to change their strategy 
and develop a second product for commercialization based on discretes rather than a 
microchip design: 
Al said, “I think we might be able to take it to production in discretes.” The only 
reason he was able to be pretty confident about that is because we had built 
something in discretes in the form factor. We are trying to squeeze everything 
into the little tiny space. Prior to having this [working prototype], there were 
people on the team who thought it was impossible to make it out of discretes in 
the form factor.  
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When the team saw Marcone’s prototype in action, they realized a “discretes” product 
could be manufactured with the same features, although at a higher cost. The Ohm team 
knew of a niche consumer product that could support the higher price and began 
considering strategic change: should they start a second product before completing 
development on their first product?  
Before the CTO built the discretes prototype, the Ohm team described their belief 
in their technology by saying: “our microchip technology is going to change the world.” 
While decision makers wrestled with whether to change their strategy by adding a second 
product using the discretes design, the team expanded their microchip belief and shifted 
their language from “our microchip technology” to “our core technology.” Their new 
language now encompassed a broader strategy that did not require microchips. With this 
expansion in their beliefs, Ohm’s decision makers opted to change the firm’s strategy by 
adding a second discretes development program before completing their original, 
microchip product. 
How do firms change their strategy?  
The six firms that did choose to change their strategies, chose to either exit or add 
a new element to the firm’s strategy, rather than make a complete strategic reorientation. 
The type of strategic change firms chose depended on the favorability of the new 
information that triggered decision making: strategic exits were only triggered by 
problems while strategic additions were only triggered by opportunities. We identified no 
patterns with respect to the content or timing of the trigger to strategic decision-making. 
In 16 out of 21 cases of strategic change, decision makers embraced an opportunity 
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trigger, expanding the language previously used to describe their firm, technology, or 
strategy, and choosing to add an element to the current strategy. In five out of 21 cases, 
when decision makers found their beliefs in conflict with a problem trigger, they chose to 
make a strategic exit, exiting one key element of their current strategy. 
Strategic additions 
Six firms chose to make a strategic addition when facing an unanticipated 
opportunity trigger, either adopting a new value proposition for their technology or 
adding new activities for the firm.  When choosing a strategic addition, firm decision 
makers expanded the language they used to describe their beliefs and chose to add to 
their firms’ strategy in ways that fit with this new language. For example, when Farad 
realized they could affordably get contract consulting from not only the co-founder who 
had recently taken a day job, but others at his new firm, CEO Marek shifted from talking 
about maintaining their “A player” engineers by “keeping everybody in the fold” to “us 
be[ing] able to use [A player engineers]” who might work elsewhere. With his new 
language, Marek decided to expand Farad’s strategy to include partner alliances rather 
than rely solely on internal engineering staff. 
Five firms discovered new value propositions for their technologies either through 
continued technology development or through interactions with customers or partners. In 
the course of their technology development process, firms identified new use cases and 
target markets beyond what the founders had originally known about their technology 
and its potential applications. Potential partners, investors, suppliers, and other 
stakeholders engaged with several firms, introducing new ideas to expand the usage of 
  
34 
their technology. On a long drive between customer sites, one potential customer 
introduced Gauss to a new use for their existing technology. As they chatted in the truck, 
this customer mentioned how a weather pattern brought the entire industry to a standstill 
for several days that year. Gauss’s consultant, David Baker, described how this casual 
conversation uncovered an unmet market need that provided Gauss with a new value 
proposition: 
“How long did the [stoppage] last?” He said, “A good eight or ten days.” I said, 
“What do you do?” He said, “They had these [special products].”... I said, 
“Okay. Are there that many [of them] out here?” He said, “No. There’s a 
shortage of them.” [CEO Gail] says… “Well, not anymore.”  
This customer revealed that there was a significant, motivated market for a product that 
could address this shortage with a high willingness to pay. Gauss’s engineering team 
considered the customer’s story alongside their knowledge that two-thirds of the design 
of their current product could be applied to solve this problem. After this conversation in 
the truck, the Gauss team expanded their beliefs about their technology and began 
referring to their existing product as a system of three “modules” rather than as a single 
product. With their new language of modules, Gauss’ decision makers realized they could 
take the first two modules of their three module “system” and create a new, two module 
product for this market. Having expanded the language used to describe their beliefs 
about the product, Gail and his team chose a strategic addition, adding a second product 
to the firm’s product portfolio based on the first two modules.  
Opportunities did not only trigger product changes. In four cases, firms opted to 
add new elements to their organizational structure. Quite unexpectedly, four firms 
approached Hartree’s CEO Norman Beck and asked to be acquired. Beck had not planned 
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to be “an uncapitalized company thinking about acquiring other companies that are 
sometimes many times our size.” As Beck made sense of these acquisition opportunities 
and what those firms could add to Hartree, his prior language describing Hartree’s core 
value as the creation of “near- and long-term products” expanded to discuss near- and 
long-term business:  
What we have is the promise of long-term revenues and this big upside. What a 
lot of these companies don’t have is that. A lot of these companies have this on-
going near-term business. 
By expanding his beliefs from focusing on products to business, Beck now valued what 
the firm could gain from an acquisition: business assets such as direct customer 
knowledge, industry relationships, and financial inputs that Hartree did not yet have. 
With this change in language and beliefs, Beck decided to make a strategic addition and 
acquire one of the four firms.  
Strategic exits 
Firms chose a strategic exit only when confronted by a problem that conflicted 
with the beliefs underpinning their current strategy. In our sample of seven firms, three 
firms chose a strategic exit: Gauss, Joule, and Ohm, with Joule and Ohm each making 
two exits. In these five cases, decision makers accepted that the new information 
presented in a problem trigger conflicted with their beliefs about the firm and the current 
strategy and opted to make a strategic exit by discontinuing the product involved. In four 
of the five instances where firms chose a strategic exit, they went several weeks or 
months without a product defined in their strategy.  
After accepting that a problem conflicted with their beliefs, Joule, Gauss, and 
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Ohm each choose to discontinue their only products. After the head of business 
development at their ideal B2B customer told Gauss CEO Gail "we just don't care about 
[that product]", Gail accepted that this new information conflicted with Gauss’ belief that 
their product should be sold as a new part to a system already in the market. Gail 
subsequently decided to discontinue their only product without knowing what would 
replace it. Joule’s co-founders believed that with 3D printing, they could produce very 
low cost, “game changing” products with a short production cycle. In the spring of 2014, 
they impressed their dream customer who ordered 500 units to be delivered by October. 
Seven months later, the team and Joule engineer Sean Aalto realized that they would not 
be able to deliver on time and meet the expectations of their dream customer:  
Everything was so tight to the point where if we don’t talk to a manufacturer this 
week we’re not going to make it. We went on for about two weeks just by the 
skin of somehow managing to do all the things that are absolutely necessary just 
in time where we still had maybe a little bit of belief that it could be done. All of 
a sudden, we didn’t. 
The news that manufacturing costs were rising and delivery would not be on time 
conflicted with Joule’s belief that their development process was low cost and fast. 
Joule’s customer had a specific annual product cycle and October was the only delivery 
option until the following year. In late August, CEO Oscar Mata decided to let their 
dream customer know they would not be able to deliver the order. Knowing that they 
could not sustain the firm financially if Joule had no other customers until the following 
October, Mata and his team decided to discontinue their only product and, as Mata 
described it, take a break: 
What we decided to do was to take a one week content break, or a product 
break, and focus purely on operational structure and process. We reorganized 
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our office space. We reorganized our prototype space. We redid the file 
management system. We redid the management structure and moved over to an 
Agile Scrum system... It was cathartic. 
After their break, Mata went back to networking with investors and potential customers 
across several different markets to do more thorough customer research and select a new 
use case that could fill the hole in their strategy. In these cases, firms chose strategic exit 
without knowing what would fill the hole in their strategy.  
Ohm also encountered problems that conflicted with their beliefs, and, in one 
case, was lucky to have a second product in place when they chose a strategic exit and 
discontinued their primary product. In 2013, Ohm had two products: 1) a microchip 
component to be sold first as a niche product and then as a mass market B2B product and 
2) a non-microchip, non-component product to be sold in a secondary, direct to consumer 
market. Three years after founding, Ohm still did not know how much R&D time would 
be required to develop a manufacturable microchip design for the mass market product 
and the management team demanded a revised development schedule from the engineers. 
When the engineers estimated that it would take another two years to produce, Ohm’s 
CEO and CTO were forced to accept that this new development schedule conflicted with 
their belief that they should introduce this new to the world technology as a mass market 
B2B product. CTO Marcone described how they chose a strategic exit:  
I came to the conclusion that it didn’t make sense to continue to invest in this 
other project unless it could be proven to some reasonable degree that there was 
a chance to make it work on a reasonable timeline. I didn’t think that was going 
to happen. I also didn’t see what else we could do...I don’t remember exactly if I 
walked straight from [the timeline meeting] to [the CEO]. But in a very short 
period of time, yes, we started talking about it: “Look, this is crazy. Here’s what 
they [engineers]’re telling me. It obviously doesn’t make sense.” She said, “Yes, 
it doesn’t make sense. We already missed the market. We can’t miss it by two 
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more years.” 
Facing a two-year delay, Marcone accepted that the microchip product would not be the 
high volume, high visibility, mass market product Ohm believed would attract investors. 
Either Ohm could launch their non-microchip product in a lower visibility market or 
Ohm would run out of money and close its doors. Ohm chose to discontinue its microchip 
product even though this choice erased the high visibility product the firm had used to 
acquire funding. After this decision, Ohm still had one, low visibility non-microchip 
product, but now faced a significant hole in their strategy, losing the story that had been 
the basis for their fund raising pitch. Ohm would need to create a new fundraising 
narrative before their next funding round. When decision makers at the three firms 
making strategic exits encountered a problem that conflicted with their beliefs, they chose 
a strategic exit that left a gap in their strategy rather than fill this gap with a new, 
complete strategy. 
As shown in Figure 2, firms encountered new information that interrupted their 
planned activities and triggered consideration of strategic change. When decision makers’ 
beliefs were unaffected by a trigger, they rejected the option to change their strategy. 
When decision makers’ beliefs were affected by a trigger, they revisited the beliefs 
underlying their strategy and chose to change their strategy. When decision makers’ 
beliefs were affected by an unanticipated opportunity, they expanded their beliefs and 
made a strategic addition, adding a new element to their strategy. When decision makers’ 
beliefs were affected by a problem, they accepted that the new information conflicted 
with their beliefs and chose a strategic exit without identifying a replacement strategy. In 
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sum, we found that the type of strategic change selected depended on the relationship 
between the favorability of the new information that triggered decision making and 
decision makers’ beliefs about their firm’s strategy. 
 
 
 
When Does Strategic Change Become a Pivot? 
When firms chose to change their strategy, they chose to change only one element 
in their strategy at a time, within the context of independently triggered decisions. They 
did not, in one decision, opt for a complete strategic reorientation through the reallocation 
or restructuring of activities, resources, and attention. Decision makers made strategy 
exits and additions as triggers emerged throughout the innovation process rather than as 
part of sequential, planned, linear decision making. When firms chose to make a strategic 
Figure 2: Explaining when firms choose strategic change 
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exit, they left a significant hole in their strategy, which was left unaddressed until 
decision makers faced a separate opportunity trigger and opted to make a strategic 
addition that could address this hole. When firms chose to make a strategic addition, they 
did not inherently redefine the direction of the firm with one decision. Firms that pivoted 
only did so through the gradual accumulation of multiple strategic decisions over time, 
rather than reorient the firm’s strategy with one decision at once. While six of the seven 
firms in our study chose to make at least one strategic change, only three firms (Gauss, 
Ohm, Joule) pivoted and changed the direction of the firm through reallocating or 
restructuring their activities, resources, and attention over time. Figure 3 shows how 
strategic decisions either did or did not accumulate to produce a pivot by comparing the 
stream of decisions in two firms that either did (Gauss) or did not (Coulomb) pivot. 
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Figure 3: The stream of strategic decisions in pivoting and non-pivoting firms 
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With an in-depth analysis of the strategic decisions made at a firm that did not 
pivot, we show how firms encounter an emerging stream of triggers which prompt 
strategic decisions and sometimes strategic change, without necessarily producing a 
pivot. For example, Coulomb faced five opportunities and one problem that triggered six 
decisions at risk for strategy change during the period of study, but never pivoted. Five of 
these triggers did not contradict or expand Coulomb’s beliefs about their strategy and 
Coulomb rejected these options to change their strategy. Only once did Coulomb choose 
strategic change, making one strategic addition, a stepping stone product, without 
changing the direction or attention of the firm. Coulomb’s initial customer was interested 
in a paired down version of their machine that could be dropped-in to the customer’s 
current operations without committing to the system changes Coulomb’s full innovation 
proposed. When considering the customer’s proposal, Coulomb expanded their beliefs 
and chose a strategic addition without reorienting their strategy. They decided to create a 
drop-in version of their machine as a stepping stone product to help customers gain trust 
with their technology and help Coulomb gain feedback and revenue earlier than if 
pursuing the full system change.  
In contrast, Gauss did pivot their strategy through an accumulation of eighteen 
strategic decisions including one strategic exit and six strategic additions, as depicted in 
Figure 3. Early on, Gauss discontinued their only product after learning that their ideal 
customer had no willingness to pay for Gauss’s product. This strategic exit temporarily 
eliminated activities related to product development and the firm spent the next six 
months with a strategic gap and no defined product. During that time, the team continued 
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developing its technology; acquiring funding and engaging in market research activities. 
Eventually, during a conversation with another entrepreneur firm, Gauss’s CEO learned 
about the maintenance and energy needs of a market not previously considered, 
triggering a strategic addition: a new product targeting a different market. While this new 
product altered some of Gauss’s activities, a bigger shift came years later when a 
conversation on a drive between customer sites triggered a separate decision at risk for 
strategic change. This time, Gauss expanded their beliefs about their technology’s 
structure and value proposition and decided to add a second product line.  
After seven decisions that produced a strategic exit and six additions, Gauss 
pivoted from a single product firm planning phased introductions across multiple markets 
to a technology services firm focused on a single market. They had changed their 
activities, resources, and attention; and furthermore, they had changed the language used 
to describe the firm. In 2012, when Gauss’s founders applied to an accelerator program, 
they described themselves as a product company developing a novel technology to 
replace a ubiquitous, mature technology by being “flexible, robust, and more efficient.” 
In the spring of 2017, CEO Gail described Gauss in a news magazine interview as a 
“solutions company” using new technology to provide reliable services to customers in 
one industry. Gauss had pivoted their strategy, which was evidenced in both a change in 
the nature of their activities and their own self-reflection and explanation of their 
strategy. 
Thus, a pivot is not a single decision to change the firm from one strategy to 
another, but rather is the product of multiple independently triggered decisions that 
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unfold over time. A firm pivots by reorienting the firm’s strategic direction by exiting 
and adding elements to a strategy one at a time, eventually producing a cumulative 
reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, and attention. Our informants never 
discussed a pivot in the present tense, but only used the term in the past tense to refer to a 
strategy transition that had evolved in retrospect. This suggests that, for the 
entrepreneurial firms we studied, a change in strategic orientation was not the product of 
a single decision but rather a stream of accumulated decisions, punctuated by 
unanticipated triggers.  
Discussion 
Entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology innovations are often praised 
for having pivoted their strategies, but the term pivot is inconsistently defined and 
neglects the deep literature on strategic change. This may be because research on 
strategic change has examined strategic renewal and reorientation primarily in the context 
of established firms (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; Agarwal and Helfat 2009). 
Strategic change is theorized to result from a gap in performance (Cyert and March 1963; 
Levitt and March 1988), but there are some limitations in applying this explanation to 
early stage entrepreneurial firms. First, easily comparable discrete performance data is 
not always available (Joseph and Gaba 2015) and second, early stage entrepreneurial 
firms have yet to produce a trajectory of performance data to even allow such 
comparison. Third, extant explanations of strategic change are often reactive, focusing on 
why firms do or do not change in response to the innovations of others (Henderson 1993; 
Christensen 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), without understanding how decisions about 
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strategic change emerge from a firm’s own innovation process. For example, Ohm did 
not know they could manufacture their technology without a microchip until the CTO 
built a prototype that convinced the team a non-microchip product was possible. Yet, 
research on strategic change does not explain when and how entrepreneurial firms 
engaged in the process of innovation decide to pivot their strategies. Without 
understanding how entrepreneurs receive and act on new information as they innovate, 
we cannot explain how strategies evolve at this this early stage. Through a longitudinal 
field study of seven early stage energy and cleantech hardware firms developing new 
technology innovations, we examined the conditions that led entrepreneurs to select 
strategic change when confronting 93 strategic decisions at risk for change. 
 We found that when decision makers’ beliefs were expanded by a favorable 
opportunity trigger, they chose to make a strategic addition, adding a new element to the 
firms’ strategy. When decision makers’ beliefs were contradicted by an unfavorable 
problem trigger, they chose to make a strategic exit, discontinuing the affected product. 
While all but one firm made strategic changes, these changes did not, necessarily produce 
a pivot or full reorientation of the firm’s strategy. A pivot was not the product of a single 
strategic decision, but of the accumulation of independently triggered decisions that 
ultimately reoriented the firm over time. This understanding is more consistent with 
emergent rather than planned views of strategy (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Drawing 
on the literature on strategic change and renewal (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Gioia et al. 
1994; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; Van de Ven and Poole 1995), we offer a 
grounded definition of a pivot as a change in a firm’s strategy that reorients the firm’s 
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strategic direction through a reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, and 
attention. We found that three of the seven firms in our study achieved a pivot during the 
time of study and identify the conditions that did or did not produce a pivot. We 
contribute a grounded theoretical understanding of when entrepreneurial firms choose to 
change their strategy and when these changes produce a pivot, which is important to both 
the strategic change and entrepreneurship literatures.  
When and how firms choose strategic change 
Strategy scholars have examined when, in the face of environmental shifts, firms 
make or fail to make strategic change and renew their strategies (Agarwal and Helfat 
2009; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997). However, this research has been limited by a 
preoccupation with strategic change as the outcome of interest. In examining only those 
contexts where change is expected and not changing is a failure of either enactment or 
perception of the environment, the conditions under which a firm can reasonably reject 
strategic change are not typically considered. By identifying the triggers to decision 
making as well as the decisions at risk for change, we give equal attention to rejecting 
and selecting strategic change. Examining the full set of decisions made, we find that the 
firms we studied rejected more often than they selected strategic change. Entrepreneurial 
firms engaged in developing innovations confront options for strategic change prior to 
being able to, with certainty, determine if their existing strategy is achievable. Thus, the 
performance gap explanation (Cyert and March 1963; Levitt and March 1988) for 
strategic change is less relevant for entrepreneurial firms.  
The entrepreneurial firms we studied faced significant uncertainty and relied upon 
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beliefs about the firm, the technology and the market as placeholders for missing and 
uncertain information. They based their strategies upon those beliefs, knowing these 
beliefs could be revised at any time. As decision makers engaged in innovation, those 
beliefs were tested through a continuous stream of both favorable (opportunities) and 
unfavorable (problems) triggers that interrupted planned activities and punctuated 
strategic decision making. The firms we studied continuously engaged in validating or 
testing their ideas with customers, suppliers, partners and their own engineers which 
introduced new information that triggered strategic decisions at risk for change. While 
Ott, Eisenhardt, and Bingham (2017) distinguish between strategy by thinking and 
strategy by doing in entrepreneurial firms, we contribute an understanding of how 
strategy by thinking and doing unfold after strategy formation. Only by doing strategy 
could decision makers discover where their beliefs either conflicted with or could be 
expanded by an emerging stream of unanticipated opportunities and problems. When the 
beliefs that the firm’s strategy rested upon were upheld, decision makers rejected 
strategic change as the inputs to the original strategy were unchanged. When beliefs were 
altered by new information, the inputs decision makers relied upon for their strategy 
choices were altered, changing the basis of the original strategy and prompting strategic 
change.  
While the focus of strategy research has traditionally been on established firms’ 
reactions, or inactions, to environmental shifts (e.g. Barr 1998; Dutton and Duncan 1987; 
Christensen 1997; Gilbert 2005), we show how opportunities for strategic change emerge 
through the process of developing new innovations. Firms developing new innovations 
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face significant uncertainty (Packard, Clark, and Klein 2017; Coase and Wang 2011), and 
constantly encounter new information about both the potential and the limits of their 
innovations as the development process unfolds. These conditions likely apply not just to 
entrepreneurial firms but may be generalizable to other types of firms engaged in the 
process of innovation (Thomke 1997; MacCormack and Verganti 2003). We identify the 
conditions under which innovating firms choose to change their strategy: when new 
information expands or conflicts with the beliefs underlying the firms’ current strategy.  
This study focused on the decision to make strategic change and did not address 
whether firms successfully executed their choice to change. There are two perspectives in 
the literature on whether favorable or unfavorable conditions catalyze strategic change. 
Jackson and Dutton (1988) found that firms were more likely to enact strategic change in 
response to problems or threats. However, Gilbert (2005) found that while threats were 
stronger catalysts for the decision to change, firms needed to transition from a threat to an 
opportunity mindset to successfully execute change. In contrast with both of these 
findings, three quarters of the decisions to choose strategic change in our study were 
triggered by opportunities, not by threats. It is possible that the longitudinal nature of our 
data collection allowed us a vantage to identify opportunities to change that are not 
typically observable in prior research designs. One way to reconcile our findings with 
Gilbert (2005) is to consider the unit of analysis. Gilbert observed a firm transition from a 
perceived threat that initiated strategic change to an opportunity mindset as a condition 
for successfully executing strategy change. Our research suggests an alternative 
interpretation: what he might have observed was a series of decisions; first involving a 
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problem leading to a strategic exit, later followed by an opportunity with the problem 
leading to a strategic addition. Only after the completion of both decisions would Gilbert 
have observed a successful, firm level strategic change and reorientation.  
What is a pivot? How firms make strategic reorientations 
Colloquial use of the term pivot implies a single choice to pivot or reorient the 
firm’s strategy. However, the Lean Startup methodology (Ries 2011; Blank 2013) 
considers a pivot to be a change to one element of the firm’s strategy based on a 
hypothesis test, much as a scientist revises elements of scientific theory with the results 
of each scientific experiment. Building on the strategic change literature that discusses 
reorientation (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Gioia et al. 1994; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 
1997; Van de Ven and Poole 1995), we defined a pivot as a change in a firm’s strategy 
that reorients the firm’s strategic direction through a reallocation or restructuring of 
activities, resources, and attention. While almost all firms in our sample choose strategic 
change at least once during the study, only 3 out of 7 (Gauss, Joule, and Ohm) actually 
pivoted, reorienting the firm in a way that restructured activities, resources, and attention. 
Pivots were never accomplished with one decision but rather through the accumulation of 
a series of decisions to either exit or add elements to their strategy over time. One 
implication of this finding is that strategic change that reorients an entrepreneurial firm’s 
strategy should not be examined as a single decision triggered by a single catalyzing 
event, but rather as a series of decisions triggered by a continuous flow of independently 
introduced information. Our grounded explanation of how pivots do or do not happen 
aligns more with the tenets of the Lean Strategy methodology, that entrepreneurs make a 
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series of small changes to reach a tested strategy, than with the colloquial expectation that 
entrepreneurial firms pivot and “spin on a dime” repurposing a technology from one 
application to another. 
Pivoting firms made both strategic additions and strategic exits; while firms that 
did not pivot (Coulomb, Farad, and Hartree) made only strategic additions. Future 
research should examine whether both additions and exits are necessary to produce a 
pivot. In firms that did not pivot, we observed decision makers considering strategic 
options that would have redirected firm strategy. For example, customers pushed back 
against Coulomb’s strategy to sell the output of their innovative manufacturing machine 
because the customers would prefer to buy the entire machine and operate it themselves. 
Had Coulomb’s decision makers expanded their beliefs about their firm and its position 
in the value chain, Coulomb could have made a strategic addition to become a producer 
of manufacturing machines rather than an on-demand supplier of a key component. 
While this would have produced a pivot for Coulomb, the triggering information did not 
expand their existing beliefs and trigger a choice for strategic change. Future research 
could examine what types of information are more likely to lead decision makers to 
expand their beliefs.  
Identifying and assessing founding business opportunities are core topics within 
entrepreneurship research (Busenitz et al. 2003; Shane and Venkataraman 2000); 
however, the literature’s attention to opportunities tends to start and stop at firm founding 
(Shepherd, Williams, and Patzelt 2015). Beyond their initial founding opportunities, our 
firms faced an on-going stream of unanticipated opportunities after founding that 
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triggered consideration of strategic change with the potential to reorient the firm's 
strategy. Our current understanding of entrepreneurship as the discovery, evaluation, and 
exploitation of a single founding opportunity (Shane and Venkataraman 2000) treats the 
identification of opportunities as solely a founding event rather than as a continuous 
process. This conception not only puts an artificially linear structure on the 
entrepreneurial process, but also ignores the ways in which a stream of opportunities post 
founding affects the evolution of firm strategy. In our study, every firm that pivoted made 
a strategic addition that was triggered by an unanticipated opportunity not associated with 
the founding opportunity. In order for these post-founding opportunities to emerge, firms 
had to be engaged in the executing on their original strategy. In other words, only by 
doing strategy and executing on their beliefs about the founding opportunity, did 
entrepreneurs discover where new problems and opportunities lay. 
Our research shows how firms evolve their strategies through strategic additions 
and exits prompted by new information that either expanded or conflicted decision 
makers’ beliefs. This suggests that scholars need to extend their research designs to 
include the non-linear, iterative path of opportunities firms experience post-founding. We 
cannot establish traction on how strategy evolves without tracing the on-going stream of 
opportunities that shape strategy evolution. For example, are founding opportunities and 
on-going opportunities evaluated differently by entrepreneurs? Entrepreneurial action on 
a founding opportunity is initiated when knowledge about a specific opportunity and 
belief in one’s ability to capture it grow in relationship to some amount of willingness to 
bear uncertainty (McMullen and Shepherd 2006). On-going opportunities occur in a 
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context where the entrepreneur already has a team and an infrastructure in place to take 
advantage of them. The existence of the firm is no longer in question when evaluating an 
unanticipated, post-founding opportunity. In this context, the entrepreneur already has 
confidence in the firm’s viability, as he or she has already decided to start the firm, and 
will only evaluate the emerging opportunities against the current strategy and the beliefs 
held. Further research would do well to explore how the on-going stream of opportunities 
entrepreneurial firms encounter after founding affects firm strategy and ultimately firm 
success. 
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KEEP LEARNING & CARRY ON: HOW ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS LEARN 
WHILE CHOOSING NOT TO CHANGE STRATEGY 
 
In some fields the way to succeed is to have a vision of what you want to 
achieve, and to hold true to it no matter what setbacks you encounter. Starting 
startups is not one of them. The stick-to-your-vision approach works for 
something like winning an Olympic gold medal, where the problem is well-
defined. Startups are more like science, where you need to follow the trail 
wherever it leads. So don't get too attached to your original plan, because it's 
probably wrong. Most successful startups end up doing something different than 
they originally intended—often so different that it doesn't even seem like the 
same company.  
– Paul Graham, Entrepreneur & Y-Combinator Founder2 
 
Technology entrepreneurs are advised by investors, mentors, academics, and 
peers to learn as much as they can about their firm, market, technology, and financial 
options, so that they can change their strategies to improve their likelihood for success 
(Blank 2013; Murray and Tripsas 2004; Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf 2014; Ries 
2011; McGrath and MacMillan 1995; Eisenmann, Ries, and Dillard 2013). Hero stories 
of successful entrepreneurial firms often paint a picture of a firm that succeeded because 
it changed its strategy, as if change is inherently the optimal decision. However, no one 
can truly know ex ante which path is the optimal choice for an entrepreneurial firm. 
While storytelling has emphasized the outcome of strategic change, what these 
entrepreneurial heroes did before that was more important: they learned. 
Organizational learning is “the process of improving actions through better 
knowledge and understanding” (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 803). Entrepreneurial technology 
                                               
2 Graham (2006) http://www.paulgraham.com/startupmistakes.html 
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firms act in a dynamic, uncertain context (Packard, Clark, and Klein 2017; McMullen and 
Shepherd 2006; Aldrich and Ruef Forthcoming). Under dynamic uncertainty, firms make 
decisions and choose their strategies based on a mix of accepted information and believed 
assumptions (Posen and Levinthal 2012). They continually learn so that their knowledge 
is more accurate and complete, which will improve their decision making. By learning, 
the entrepreneurial firm knows more about each potential strategy and is in a better 
position to assess which has greater odds for success. 
Rarely does an entrepreneurial technology firm face a simple decision when 
considering strategic change. When they choose to make a strategic change, they reorient 
and redirect the firm through reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, and 
attention (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; Gioia et al. 1994; 
Van de Ven and Poole 1995). Entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology 
innovations make decisions about what actions, resources, and attention they will use to 
address their technology development, market development, financial expenses, and 
organizational structures. Because these entrepreneurial firms have limited resources, 
both human and financial, any decision or action is likely to have ramifications across all 
of these areas. 
Strategic change research focusing on established firms in stable contexts suggest 
that when, or if, a firm learns new information about its environment, the firm should 
change its strategy to fit that new knowledge (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; Agarwal 
and Helfat 2009; Zajac and Shortell 1989). However, as entrepreneurial technology firms 
act in a dynamic, uncertain context about which their knowledge includes a significant 
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number of believed assumptions rather than factual information, existing theory may not 
directly apply. What they learn affects their knowledge about their environment through 
both their stock of accepted information and their believed assumptions. For these firms, 
the appropriate response to new learning might not be strategic change. In fact, while the 
hero stories may emphasize change, entrepreneurs are also known for their passionate 
perseverance (Cardon et al. 2009) and are more likely to choose to not change their 
strategy than to change it . How do entrepreneurial technology firms in a dynamic, 
uncertain context learn during the process of choosing not to change their strategy? 
I address this question through a longitudinal field study of seven early stage 
entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology innovations in the energy and 
cleantech sector. Through periodic interactions over a one to three year period, I 
interviewed and observed founders and team members regarding decisions that affected 
the fundamental definition and core processes of their firms to obtain the set of strategic 
decisions at risk for change.  I analyzed 80 strategic decisions for which the firm 
considered reorienting and redirecting the firm, but in which the firms chose not to 
change. From this analysis, I developed a framework that explains the process by which 
firms learn and use their learning during decision making for which they chose not to 
change their strategy. This process involves three phases: first, firms acquire new 
knowledge about the uncertainties they face; second, they use that learning to appraise 
their current strategy and activities; and third, they determine how best to carry the firm 
forward without changing their strategy.  
With this research, I contribute to our understanding of early stage entrepreneurial 
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firm strategy, organizational learning under uncertainty, and the choice to not make 
strategic change.  
Theoretical Background: Learning and Change 
Organizational learning has long been tightly entwined in the literature with 
change, which has impeded our understanding about learning under uncertainty when 
firms can learn and still rationally choose not to change (Fiol and Lyles 1985).  Early 
research on organizations defined learning in terms of both knowledge gained and the 
change resulting from that knowledge (e.g. Simon 1969; Chandler 1962; Cyert and 
March 1963). As a dissenting voice, Fiol and Lyles (1985) argued that researchers should 
distinguish between learning and change, to separate cognitive changes in knowledge 
from behavioral changes in activities, because they are not always related. However their 
dissent has had little effect on the literature. More recently, Argote and Miron-Spektor 
(2011) defined organizational learning as “a change in the organization that occurs as the 
organization acquires experience” (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011: 1124). Argote and 
Miron-Spektor acknowledged that this definition poses the follow-on question: “change 
in what?” Fiol and Lyles (1985) would answer: change in knowledge. 
Organizational learning, cognitive change from the acquisition of new knowledge, 
can be either the catalyst for or a reaction to behavioral change. Learning through 
experimentation and trial-and-error happens when the firm changes their behavior to gain 
knowledge from the consequences of new actions (Argyris and Schon 1978; Levitt and 
March 1988; Dodgson 1993; Rerup and Feldman 2011). When such learning is 
incidental, the result of unplanned change, firms can be spurred by their new knowledge 
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to search or experiment to learn more. Likewise, vicarious learning, acquired from the 
experiences of others, can also catalyze firms to seek out new learning. In the reverse, 
firms whose routines are too stable, with no deviation, do not learn and instead 
experience organizational inertia and remain unchanged (Levitt and March 1988).  
The challenges inherent in studying learning have further entwined learning and 
change. Many studies have used the outcome of behavioral change as a more easily 
measured proxy for learning (e.g. Dencker, Gruber, and Shah 2009; Haunschild and 
Sullivan 2002; Mayer and Argyres 2004; Simon 1969; Chandler 1962). For example, 
Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) measured airlines learning through behavioral change by 
counting whether the number of accident or incident experiences decreased. By 
measuring behavioral change outcomes, researchers can capture instances of both explicit 
and tacit learning, which cannot be collected through questionnaires (Argote and Miron-
Spektor 2011).  
While research on organizational learning has focused on change, research on 
strategic change has also emphasized the role of learning in strategic change (Barr 1998; 
Barr, Stimpert, and Huff 1992; Kuwada 1998; Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992; Williams, 
Chen, and Agarwal 2017). A predominant question addressed in this literature asks when 
and why do firms fail to change their strategy after their environment has changed and 
they no longer have strategic fit (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 
1997; Zajac and Shortell 1989). Some firms fail to change because they are unable to see 
or accept environmental change, such as technology incumbents that do not recognize the 
threat in the faster development trajectories of new technologies (Christensen 1997; 
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Gilbert 2005; Henderson 1993). Others fail to change because they cannot mobilize to 
enact strategic changes (Eggers and Park 2018), as exemplified by film photography firm 
Polaroid during their industry’s transition from film to digital (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000).  
This literature, while asking an important question – “why do firms fail to make 
strategic change?” – misses a key factor, that not making strategic change does not 
necessarily mean the firm was unable to identify the need or to enact change. First, not all 
decisions about strategic change rationally conclude that the firm should make a change. 
The choice to not change strategy may in fact not be the result of missing the 
information, but of learning that refined the firm’s understanding of its strategy and its 
context instead of contradicting that understanding. Second, firms considering strategic 
change are not limited to a binary outcome: to change or to do nothing. Firms can make 
adjustments to their activities that would not constitute a strategic reorientation or 
redirection, and as such would not be considered strategic change. In a stable context in 
which the firm has a historical understanding of their environment, new learning is likely 
to be about environmental shifts away from that stability, for which the firm would want 
to respond to with behavioral changes. However, firms in an uncertain context have an 
incomplete understanding of their environment and, as such, may have outcomes from 
learning for which cognitive changes do not direct the firm to make behavioral changes.  
Learning is the change in knowledge as the firm acquires experience, that 
knowledge includes both accepted information and believed assumptions. In our research, 
we focus on learning and new knowledge as accepted information. However, for firms 
under high uncertainty, knowledge includes a considerable volume of believed 
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assumption. A firm’s strength of belief in the knowledge it holds can affect what learning 
the firm seeks out as well as how new learning is weighed in decision making. Posen and 
Levinthal (2012) found that strength of beliefs can overpower the effect of new 
information for firms in a dynamic environment deciding whether to alter the balance of 
exploration and exploitation in their search strategies. While decision makers accept the 
information that they hold as true, they do not necessarily privilege it above believed 
assumptions or give it more consideration during decision making. To understand both 
learning and decisions about change for firms under uncertainty, we need to understand 
the role of believed assumptions in both. 
Entrepreneurial firms and firms developing novel technology innovations that 
could bring discontinuous technological change to an industry exist in dynamic and 
uncertain contexts. These firms face significant uncertainty regarding their technology 
development, market competition and consumer interest, financial resource availability, 
organizational processes, and routines (Stinchcombe 1965; McMullen and Shepherd 
2006; Packard, Clark, and Klein 2017). For each area of uncertainty, these firms have 
incomplete knowledge bolstered by a set of believed assumptions. As they learn and 
acquire new knowledge, these firms are refining their beliefs and adding to their stock of 
information.  
While organizational learning has been examined as an antecedent to strategic 
change in established firms whose stable environments have shifted, less is known about 
learning without change under uncertainty. In a dynamic, uncertain context what firms 
learn will refine their believed assumptions and augment incomplete information. To this 
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end, this paper examines how entrepreneurial technology firms learn during the process 
of choosing not to change their strategy. 
Research Methods 
This study is part of a larger project that seeks to better understand how 
entrepreneurial firms developing novel technologies evolve and change during their 
earliest, embryonic stage. After exploring when and how such firms choose to change 
their strategies, I was intrigued by two observations: 1) in the majority of the data firms 
chose not to change their strategies, and 2) the choice to not change was a purposeful 
process and not simply the result of inaction or inertia. With these observations in mind, I 
reanalyzed this subset of the data with a focus on organizational learning to examine how 
entrepreneurial technology firms learn from and during the process of choosing not to 
change their strategy. 
Qualitative field methods are appropriate to address this question as they allow for 
in depth investigation of a phenomenon whose boundaries are not clearly evident 
beforehand (Langley 1999; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Bettis et al. 2015). Through 
longitudinal, real-time field research of seven early stage entrepreneurial firms 
developing hardware in the energy and cleantech sector, I was able to examine the full 
process of decision making about strategic change regardless of the choice ultimately 
made by the firm (Van de Ven 1992; Van de Ven and Poole 1995). By capturing the 
knowledge and assumptions held before and after decision making, I was able to directly 
investigate the learning process at each firm, without relying on indirect measures of 
learning such as the choices made in reaction to new knowledge. By capturing the 
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duration of the decision making process, I was able to examine when firms opted not to 
make a strategic change, to identify how they learned and used new knowledge, and what 
other actions they took. 
Research setting: energy & cleantech hardware 
To maximize the opportunity to capture and examine both decision making about 
strategic change and learning, I chose a research setting in which a large number of 
entrepreneurial firms faced significant uncertainty on several fronts. Currently, in the 
energy and cleantech sector, many entrepreneurial firms are developing novel 
innovations from new and recombined technology knowledge to address global issues of 
energy efficiency, sustainability, pollution, and energy generation (Mowery, Nelson, and 
Martin 2010; Nanda, Younge, and Fleming 2015).  
Entrepreneurial firms in this sector face technological, market, financial, and 
organizational uncertainties. To develop manufacturable products, their R&D teams need 
to integrate new, uncertain technology knowledge with extant subsystems. Only by going 
through the integration process can they uncover previously unknown limits and 
unexpected features of their technology and engineering designs (e.g. Tyre and von 
Hippel 1997; Clark 1985). Since they aim to create new product categories or replace 
current technologies, these pioneering firms can only assume which technologies and 
designs will be preferred by the market (Grodal, Gotsopoulos, and Suarez 2015; Rao 
2008) and whether they will achieve technological dominance (Suarez 2004). 
Entrepreneurial firms face ongoing financial uncertainty as their financial resources are 
awarded at intervals with only enough resources to reach specific milestones, and firms 
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cannot know what funding will be available to meet the next milestone (Gompers 1995). 
Specifically in energy and cleantech, recent high profile failures of firms involving 
federal government loans, such as Solyndra and A123 Systems, have damaged the 
reputation of the sector in the eyes of investors, many of whom have decreased or ceased 
their participation (Hargadon and Kenney 2012). Lastly, these firms face uncertainty 
about their internal organizational structures and external supply chains. As new firms 
they are targeting market disruption at the same time as they are trying to build 
relationships with firms in their supply chain, firms who have pre-existing relationships 
with industry incumbents and little reason to trust or take risks on new firms or new 
technologies (Stinchcombe 1965).  
Research sample 
I employed a theoretically driven sample design by selecting firms based on 
characteristics that increased the opportunity to observe and examine the constructs 
within my research question (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Within the energy and 
cleantech sector, I focused on entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology 
hardware products for four reasons. First, hardware is understudied as compared to 
software based technology entrepreneurship. Second, the integration and scaling of 
hardware designs for production can introduce unknown technical and manufacturing 
problems that can be difficult and costly to change (Clark 1985). Third, physical 
components and complex subsystems increase the number and consequence of the firm’s 
relationships with suppliers and external partners. Lastly, hardware development is more 
explicit and observable to the researcher who can directly observe the development 
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process and see physical changes in equipment and prototypes over time, while 
differences in software code could be more challenging to observe. 
Firms were selected based on two criteria. First they were pre-sales at the time of 
entry into the study. Sales involve contractual commitments to customers as well as 
suppliers, which can decrease a firm’s plasticity and the opportunities to observe 
decisions regarding strategic change. Second, each firm employed at least three people at 
the time of entry into the study. Additional staff indicate that founders have committed to 
a business venture and moved beyond just the invention of a technology idea. 
Furthermore, additional staff require organizational structure, resources, and some 
amount of verbalization of the firm strategy, goals, and learning. 
The seven firm sample was compiled through introductions made by the 
researchers’ university network of entrepreneurs. All firms were located in the Boston 
metropolitan area at the time of entry to the study. Founders were approached by email or 
in person and asked to participate in a field based research study on how entrepreneurial 
firms in nascent technology industries navigate strategic change. Additionally, they were 
told that each firm would be kept unidentifiable in presentation and publication of the 
research. To this end, all firm and informant names presented are pseudonyms and details 
about the technologies and products under development are disguised.  
All seven firms were founded to commercialize novel technology hardware and 
create a new market or replace an existing technology. The sample of firms founded 
between 2007 and 2013 includes a variety of technologies within the energy and 
cleantech sector such as power generation and storage (Coulomb, Farad, Gauss); energy 
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efficiency improvements of electrical systems (Joule, Ohm); and pollution (Ergon, 
Hartree). All firm founders had educations and backgrounds in engineering: three with 
prior startup experience and four recently graduated students.  Table 4 provides an 
overview of the firms at entry to this study.  
Table 4: Case descriptives at entry to research study 
Firm Founded Team Technology Founder experience 
Coulomb 2009 4+ Manufacturing process 2 engineering consultants & 1 engineering 
professor 
Ergon 2010 8 Chemical process 2 serial entrepreneur engineers 
Farad 2013 4 Stand-alone Product 2 former CTOs from related industry 
startups 
Gauss 2011 4+ Stand-alone Product 2 engineering students 
Hartree 2007 15 Chemical process 1 experienced engineer entrepreneur 
Joule 2011 7 Component 2 engineering graduates 
Ohm 2010 10+ Component 3 engineering graduates & 1 MBA 
+ Additional advisors, interns, consultants, or university labs not included in this count. 
 
Data collection 
I conducted 82 semi-structured interviews during which I probed founders and 
team members about strategic decisions that affected the firm’s strategy. I interviewed 
the founding entrepreneurs, top management team, board members, engineers, investors, 
and other advisors involved in strategic decisions at each firm. Introductory interviews 
began with the informant generating a list of strategic decisions that he or she deemed 
impactful for the firm. I consider strategic decisions to be related “to the long-term 
prospects of the company” and have a “critical influence on its success or failure” 
(Agarwal and Helfat 2009: 281). During initial interviews, informants were asked to 
discuss as many impactful strategic decisions as time allowed. Follow-up interviews 
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explored how previously identified strategic decisions evolved as well as new strategic 
decisions that had since emerged. Interviews averaged 70 minutes in length and all 
interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
Interviews were conducted over a one to three-year period (depending on firm 
entry to the study) to capture the evolution of firm strategy while decisions and 
recollections were contemporary. Firms entered the study at different times between the 
second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2015. Two firms (Gauss and Ohm) entered 
the study a year earlier than the other firms as a pilot to test the research design. Figure 4 
shows how these interviews were distributed by type of informant at each firm over time. 
I augmented interview data with 48 onsite observations coinciding with interviews held at 
the firms’ offices and 69 internal and external documents, including board presentations, 
articles about the firms and the founders, and stakeholder communications provided by 
informants to confirm the timing of key events. 
 
 
Figure 4: Interview Descriptives 
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Data analysis 
Data analysis was a four phase iterative inductive theory building process. In the 
first phase, I identified 147 strategic decisions from the data, across all seven firms. For 
example, when the Ohm’s management team and board spent several weeks discussing 
whether to replace the founder-CEO with a professional CEO, I coded that as a strategic 
decision. Since the research question under examination focuses on decisions about 
strategic change, I excluded 46 decisions that were made as part of the founding activities 
and therefore were part of initial strategy formation and not strategic change.  
In the second phase, I coded whether the firm’s decision makers made an explicit 
choice to change their strategy. Following Romanelli and Tushman (1994), Boeker 
(1997), and Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011), I defined strategic change as a decision 
to change their activities related to at least one element of a firm’s existing strategy, such 
as change in product line, market breadth, or partnering strategy. For example, when 
Gauss chose to add a second product, partially based on their core product design but 
offering a different value proposition for the customer, I coded that decision as a strategic 
change. I coded a decision as ‘no strategic change’ if the firm chose to not change their 
activities at all or chose to make only small adjustments in the service of maintaining 
their current strategy. For example, when Ergon expanded their Angel investor search 
internationally instead of choosing to change what type of investor or how much funding 
they targeted, I coded that as a decision to not change strategy. Given the focus here on 
decisions not to change, I excluded the 21 decisions in which the firm chose to change 
strategy from the pooled data set in the next phase of analysis. 
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With a set of 80 decisions to not change strategy, in the third phase I examined 
more closely what each firm chose to do, what actions or adjustments they made when 
they decided to not change their strategy. Through my analysis I identified three 
categories of the decision not change: to abstain, time shift, or adjust. Firms that 
abstained from change ultimately made no alteration to their activities, resource 
allocations, or attention. They did this in one of two ways. First, firms could explicitly 
decline strategic change (17/80), choosing to do none of the new or different activities 
considered during decision making. Second, firms had chosen to change their strategy but 
had that option aborted (3/80) when an external stakeholder necessary to new or different 
activities ended their relationship with the firm and therefore the opportunity for change. 
Firms that made a time shift either extended the time horizon (6/80) for completion of the 
activities to achieve their current strategy or deferred decision making about strategic 
change (5/80) leaving open the possibility that the firm might opt for that change at a 
later date. In the last and most common category (49/80), firms used new information 
acquired during decision making to adjust their activities in a manner that reinforced their 
current strategy, to improve the likelihood of success, as seen in the Ergon investor 
search example mentioned above. Table 5 shows the counts of ways to not change 
strategy taken by each firm. 
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Table 5: Ways firms chose to not change their strategy by firm 
 Ways to Not Change Strategy  
 ABSTAIN TIME SHIFT ADJUST  
 
Firm had same strategy, 
activities, & resources 
after decision making as 
before decision making 
Firm extended the time 
horizon on current strategy 
or deferred decision making 
about change 
Firm reinforced and 
improved current strategy 
without changing or 
redirecting the firm 
 
Firms Decline Abort Extend Defer Reinforce Total 
Coulomb 2   2 3 7 
Ergon 4    8 12 
Farad 2 2  1  5 
Gauss 2 1 2  7 12 
Hartree 1   2 4 7 
Joule 4  2  13 19 
Ohm 2  2  14 18 
Total 17 3 6 5 49 80 
 
To understand how and what firms learned during these decision processes, in the 
final data analysis phase, I went back to the data detailing each decision and examined 
the information and assumptions that informants mentioned as part of decision making. I 
looked for what new knowledge the firms acquired and what role that new knowledge 
played in both the choice to not change strategy and the actions taken when they opted to 
not change. I coded learning into three categories based on the impact that learning had 
on the accepted information and believed assumptions held by the firm. The three 
categories of learning were: improving accuracy, adding details, and supporting or 
opposing assumptions. Any judgment, positive or negative, about the veracity of 
information and learning was assessed by the informants, not by the researcher. I then 
coded how the firm used what was learned in the decision making process. The three 
categories for use of learning were: to clarify goals for the firm, to reassess tradeoffs, and 
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to fill execution gaps in activities for the current strategy. From this multiphase analysis, I 
contribute a theoretical framework to explain how entrepreneurial technology firms learn 
from the process of decision making for which they chose not to change their strategy. 
 
Findings: Learning and Carrying On 
Learning is how new knowledge and expertise is acquired, but how firms use 
what they learn during decision making could be unnoticeable to outsiders, particularly 
when they do not make overt changes to their strategy. Through the longitudinal data of 
this study, I was able to examine and develop a three-phase framework of how firms 
learn during the decision to not change strategy. In each of the 80 decisions examined, 
the firms acquired new knowledge and expertise, used that learning to appraise their 
current strategy, and then determined how to carry the firm forward without changing 
their strategy. In the subsections that follow, I explain each of the three phases of this 
process to illustrate how entrepreneurial firms learn, use their learning during the 
decision making, and yet find ways to not change their strategy. Figure 5 summarizes the 
three phases of this framework.  
Phase 1: Acquire  Phase 2: Appraise  Phase 3: Carry On 
LEARNING 
New Knowledge ð 
USING LEARNING  
in Decision Making ð 
DECIDING 
Ways to Not Change 
• Improve Accuracy 
• Add Details 
• Support or Oppose 
Assumptions 
 
• Clarify Goals 
• Reassess Tradeoffs 
• Fill Execution Gaps 
 
 
• Abstain from Change 
• Time Shift 
• Adjust & Reinforce 
 
Figure 5: Firm Learning During Strategic Decision Making to Not Change Strategy 
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Phase 1 Acquire: Learning New Knowledge 
All of the firms acquired new information at the initiation of decision making, as 
the trigger to the decision process as well as throughout the process of decision making. 
They incorporated that information as new knowledge by assimilating it into the firm’s 
stock of accepted information and believed assumptions. Since they faced dynamic 
uncertainty, firms continually collected new information through technology R&D, 
market research, investor relations, and conversations with customers, suppliers, and 
other stakeholders. For example, Joule found at least one industry event to attend 
whenever they considered a new product idea. Ohm CEO Cam Fahey described 
collecting alternative market information even when she was not looking for it:  
Now we are starting to get: “Oh hey, you've got this really [great product] with 
these specs. I might be able to use that one that you made for this. I might be 
able to us that one that you made for that”... You're speaking on a panel, at an 
event… Some people will just say: “Hey, I saw you're doing that... we can use it 
for this...”  
Learning from a variety of sources added to new knowledge through improved accuracy 
and added detail, as well as refining beliefs by providing either support or opposition to 
their assumptions.  
Improved Accuracy 
In the face of uncertainty, when the firms knew that they based their decisions in 
part on assumptions and incomplete information, the firms in my study continually 
collected information to improve the accuracy of their knowledge and decision making. 
For example, Gauss traveled to visit their customers’ operations at different times of the 
year, which improved the accuracy of the team’s knowledge about how the seasons and 
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weather affected their customers’ activities. The firms collected information through 
directed search and testing, but also stumbled upon it accidentally. After potential 
customers questioned whether Joule’s product would fit the dimensions that their 
customers needed, Joule ran a test during which they proposed customized sizing of their 
component product to several potential customers. Unexpectedly, customers responded: 
“We don’t feel like this is going to be reliable.” From this test, Joule’s team gained more 
accurate knowledge about their customer’s priorities: reliability was more important to 
them than customization.  
While the firms used search and experimentation to improve the accuracy of their 
knowledge of the decision under consideration, they also improved their accuracy when 
they were trying to accomplish an entirely different task. When Ohm’s management team 
decided they could not delay their customer sampling investor milestone or change their 
funding strategy, even if their sample microchip was still not working, Ohm CTO Al 
Marcone began building a non-microchip demonstration prototype. Without the 
microchip, the prototype design was too costly to sell, but Marcone believed it could 
demonstrate the technology to customers and serve as the sample to satisfy the investor 
milestone. Beyond that, the demonstration prototype provided the team with a tool that 
gave them more accurate information about their product design. As Marcone described 
it:  
What happened was that we tested [the microchip sample]. It didn’t work 
anywhere near as expected. Had we not had this tool, we wouldn’t have been 
able to do anything about it. If we hadn’t built the [non-microchip] version the 
way that we built it, which was with a micro controller and making it 
reprogrammable, then we wouldn’t have been able to do anything about it. It 
was necessary to have those two elements in place to deliver on the core value 
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proposition. 
With the demonstration prototype, Ohm’s engineering team had “measurement 
capability, in terms of what works and what doesn’t, well beyond what we’ve seen 
anywhere else.” With it, they were able to learn precise performance information that 
would help them to improve the compatibility of their design with their customers’ 
systems. Ohm built the prototype so that they would not need to change their funding 
strategy, but ultimately, it helped them to understand their technology more accurately. 
Added Details 
All of the firms were aware that they had imprecise knowledge, but they also 
knew that along the way they would learn about information they had never considered 
before, things they were not aware they did not know. When a firm stumbled upon 
information about these unknowns, that information could become the trigger to a 
decision about strategic change, a chance to embrace a new opportunity or address an 
unexpected problem that could limit their progress. Hartree CEO Norman Beck described 
such a moment when he received a phone call out of the blue from Fermi, a previously 
unknown foreign supplier in an adjacent, but not directly relevant, industry: 
He said, “Hey, we’d like to get to know you.” I immediately started Googling 
who the heck they were – because I didn’t know them – and realized that they 
were a really big company. 
Fermi’s business development team had found a video online of Beck presenting research 
during his PhD and wanted to partner with him, but Hartree’s products were not related to 
that research. Beck decided quickly that he was not interested in changing Hartree’s 
strategy to follow Fermi’s interests, but, as he described, he was happy to build a 
  
73 
relationship with Fermi and learn from them: 
They’ve been really good partners. They have an R&D facility [within a few 
hours’ drive]. It’s really close. They’ve opened their labs to us. They’ve shared 
people with us. They’ve been amazingly open and helpful. For a little company 
like ours, that’s huge.  
Beck and the Hartree team had never heard of Fermi before that call, but after that call 
they had a partner that added access to new funding programs and new scientific 
knowledge, as well as lab resources that Hartree could not otherwise afford. 
The firms also learned previously unknown details as they collected knowledge to 
support their decision making. When Ergon began selecting the features and functions of 
their control system software, they realized that to maximize both machine performance 
and replacement part revenue they needed custom control software far more sophisticated 
than what their manufacturing partner, Henry, was planning to build. Ergon’s 
management team faced a decision about whether to change both the partnership and 
their engineering activities by hiring a software team and bringing the control system 
development in house. During decision making, as Ergon collected information on how 
they might convince Henry to let go of this piece of the product, they learned about a 
bigger complication, as CEO Tad David described: 
Our initial view was that we would put all of our intelligence onto a controller… 
We realize that if Henry is going to be putting in the controller, it’s going to be 
extremely hard for us to control the software if they put in the hardware. The 
software is usually embedded. It’s flash. It’s hard-wired into this thing… and 
they have their proprietary language that we can’t even program. It would be 
very hard for us to do that.  
Since Henry had their own proprietary programming language, Ergon had to reconsider 
this decision because there was no way for Ergon to write that code internally. 
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Ultimately, Ergon’s team decided “We have to make this simple.” With the new details 
they had learned about Henry’s proprietary programing language, they decided to focus 
on convincing customers of their core value proposition rather than try to maximize the 
product with custom control system software. 
Supported or Opposed Assumptions 
A key learning goal for all of the firms was to validate their assumptions, but the 
firms in this study also found that their assumptions were supported or opposed by new 
information collected for other purposes. Ohm’s team launched a Kickstarter campaign to 
trickle in enough funding to last until their next investor milestone without changing their 
funding strategy. Aiming at two birds with one stone, they thought they would also be 
able to demonstrate to their investors the market interest Ohm believed existed for their 
direct-to-consumer product. When they reached their crowdfunding goal in less than one 
day, they gained specific information that supported their assumptions about the market’s 
interest.  
The firms also learned new information that opposed their assumptions and, yet, 
still chose to not change their strategy. Gauss was founded on the idea that they could use 
a known technology in a completely different way to achieve lower cost, greater 
flexibility, and quick customization. To achieve this, they assumed that they would need 
to develop their own design of the core component. When the custom component still did 
not work after CEO Robert Gail had started talking to potential customers to arrange a 
pilot test, the firm had to decide whether to change their schedule, change their design, or 
change their financing and target market strategy. As Gail described, through his 
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continued conversations he learned that for these customers, Gauss’s assumption that the 
product needed to be low cost might not be correct.  
[The custom component] was the thing holding us back from proving the 
product would work. It was the highest risk. It required the most money to 
develop, but the value was more in the long run. You wouldn’t see it until we 
started building several thousand units a year. We said, “This is great for our 
long-term vision… but for the [current customer], they need a product fast. 
What the team learned from their conversations directly opposed an assumption they had 
made about their customers. While Gauss’s customers did care about a low cost product, 
they were more concerned with having a solution soon. With new learning and refined 
beliefs, Gauss decided to replace the custom component with a part purchased out of a 
catalog and get back on their schedule rather than change their financing and target 
market strategy. 
With each decision, the firms learned new information that augmented and 
improved the knowledge that they would base their decisions on. What they learned 
addressed the firms’ incomplete knowledge by improving information accuracy, adding 
new details, and refining beliefs by providing either support or opposition to their 
assumptions. 
Phase 2 Appraise: Using Learning in Decision Making 
What firms in my study learned was only productive if they then used that 
learning to position the firm how they believed had the highest likelihood for success. 
Having gained new knowledge and revised assumptions, the firms put that knowledge to 
three tasks: to clarify the firm’s goals, to reassess the tradeoffs being made, and to fill 
execution gaps in the activities for the current strategy.  
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Clarify Goals 
Each firm in this study was founded with a set of goals for what the firm would 
accomplish in the short and long term, and for what the founders wanted to achieve 
personally. Unsurprisingly, as entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology, all of 
the firms had a goal to bring the new technology knowledge at the core of the firm’s 
founding to the market. At various points in a firm’s development, their goals might be as 
open-ended as “introduce [our technology] to the world” or as specific as to sign a 
contract with a customer to run a pilot. Firms used the new knowledge they learned to 
clarify goals that were ambiguous or imprecise, which then helped them choose whether 
or not to change their strategy. 
Gauss’s founders had always seen their custom-designed core component as part 
of the new technology that their firm was introducing to the world. However, when Gauss 
learned that their low cost assumption was wrong, the team asked themselves whether 
that custom component was truly part of the technology proposition they valued. Did they 
need the custom component to show the world that a technology known for decades 
could be used in a completely different way? CEO Gail described how their revised 
assumption pushed them to see their goal more clearly:  
We said, “We really have to think ‘product development’ because we’re not just 
selling [that component]. We’re selling a solution.” Which is also a difference in 
language that we started to use… We’re going to sell a whole package around it 
and a service that comes with it because that’s what the customer wants. 
Whether or not we actually do that or we outsource parts of that to different 
players doesn’t matter. 
Ultimately, the team used their new knowledge about the customer to help them more 
clearly define what “technology” their goal referred to: their goal was to introduce a new 
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use for a known technology, not to launch a custom component. From this point forward, 
Gauss’s decision makers had a clearer definition of and more precise details for the firm’s 
goals, which would help them choose among strategy options. 
Reassess Tradeoffs 
The firms in this study often found themselves choosing their strategy through 
tradeoffs. For example, Ohm traded away having a more efficient technological design to 
have a shorter development schedule. Similarly, Coulomb considered trading how large 
their initial global sustainability impact would be for earlier sales in a stepping stone 
market that the investors found more attractive. Many of the tradeoffs for the firms in this 
study involved making choices around schedule, technology design, first market, funding, 
and impact. As the firms learned, they used their new knowledge to reassess the tradeoffs 
they had made in their current strategy.  
In 2015, Coulomb found themselves being courted by several European agencies 
tasked with increasing manufacturing exactly in the area that Coulomb’s innovation 
targeted. Coulomb learned about potential subsidies and sources of funding from 
European government agencies and corporate investment groups. However, even after 
one investment group told them “We’ve never seen our technical guys this excited about 
a company before” Coulomb could not close the deal. The investment group’s board 
“wouldn’t let them invest outside of the European sphere.” Coulomb’s management team 
started to consider whether they should open an office in Europe. Less than a year before, 
Coulomb had moved from New England to the Mountain West region of the U.S., and 
found the move to be a considerable interruption to their schedule. CEO Jim Allen used 
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their new learning about this European funding option to reassess a tradeoff similar to 
one he had made before their move west: trading the inefficiencies of splitting the team 
across two offices for the value gained from new funding and sales opportunities. Despite 
Europe’s more favorable funding environment and stated interest in what Coulomb was 
developing, Allen described how the downside for the team was still too great to make 
the move:  
We made the clear decision. As we’re ramping up for production, we are 
strongly biased towards it being in the U.S. market. We want to have it close to 
our engineering team early on… I think it’s still possible that [our second 
generation product] we would roll out in Europe before the U.S. That’s still a 
possibility. That would be after we do [the first generation product] here. 
Consistent with the conclusion Coulomb had drawn before they learned about the 
European funding and sales opportunities, the firm reassessed their tradeoff of team 
productivity for additional funding and sales, and decided it was too soon for a European 
office. 
In a similar vein, months after Gauss had decided to focus on a new first product, 
CEO Gail was approached by a grant program manager who wanted the firm to submit a 
proposal based on their original product idea. The Gauss team needed funding, and a lack 
of available funding had been the reason they had switched their product focus months 
before. This grant program was specifically targeting their original product for its 
cleantech impact, so Gauss reassessed the tradeoff choice they had made: trading the 
environmental impact of the original product for a first product that potential 
development partners were interested in funding. Ultimately, Gail and his team decided 
that while grant program funding increased the availability of financial resources, it 
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would not be enough money to allow Gauss to develop the product alone. They decided 
that the new product was still the right strategy, and that they should not change back or 
attempt to develop both products. 
Fill Execution Gaps 
While learning could uncover information the firm was not aware that they did 
not know, the firms in this study also found that learning uncovered execution gaps in 
their activities that they were not aware were necessary to achieve their current strategy. 
Gaps included activities and resources that were needed to accomplish their current 
strategy but that had not been planned. Ohm’s founders figured their graduate school 
experience with Ohm’s core technology was sufficient background for them to run the 
engineering team and develop their product. After their development schedule slipped 
again and again, Ohm’s management team took a closer look at the processes within the 
firm and learned that the engineering team was losing sight of planned specifications. As 
CTO Marcone described it: 
The engineering team starts developing technology and runs into challenges then 
says, “Well, we can make this if we relax this spec and we can relax this spec.” 
It’s kind of funny. I don’t know why this happens. Even though you have the 
spec. These are the specs we started with. This is what the target is. Our team is 
inexperienced enough where we relax the specs and forget about it. 
Repeated development delays triggered multiple decisions for Ohm, about their investor 
strategy, their first product, and their organizational structure. When management learned 
what was happening with the engineering team, they examined how the team functioned 
and realized that they needed a program manager to keep track of the schedule and the 
specifications. Their new hire filled organizational process gaps, and the team revised 
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their roles and responsibilities to work more efficiently and effectively. 
As each firm learned, they updated the information they had and the assumptions 
they held. Then, they used that knowledge to inform their decision making and to 
improve the likelihood of success of their current strategy. What they did not do was 
change that strategy. 
Phase 3 Carry On: Deciding Not to Change 
The firms in this study experienced 80 strategic change decision triggers that 
initiated a decision making process, at the conclusion of which they decided not to 
change their strategy. In each case the firms made a purposeful decision of how the firm 
would carry on with their current strategy in one of three ways: abstain from change, time 
shift the current strategy, or adjust to improve the current strategy. When an 
entrepreneurial firm carried on, they chose to do so as the culmination of learning and 
decision making. 
Abstain From Change 
Firms that abstained from change had the same strategy, activities and resources 
after decision making as they did before. In 22 of the decisions examined, the firms in 
this study had either explicitly chosen to change none of their activities or had wanted to 
change but had the option aborted by a partner. Those that declined change decided that 
their current strategy had a higher likelihood of success or of greater profit. After Ergon 
was wooed by a northern state for the location of their second office, the team reassessed 
the tradeoffs between the different subsidies offered and proximities to suppliers and 
customers. Ultimately, Ergon decided that their planned southern office location would 
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provide better access to their manufacturing partner and most likely first customers, 
which they deemed more valuable than bigger subsidies and proximity to future 
customers. 
After an invitation to a local Maker event, Joule declined to change their strategy 
by adding Maker movement amateurs as new target customers. Joule’s co-founders 
believed that “great products start with fun, then become useful.” With this in mind, their 
first market strategy was to give professional engineers a chance “to experience [the 
product], to fall in love with them, to brag about them” and then discover where the 
technology could be useful. When they got the invitation, they thought amateur Makers 
might also fit this plan for early customers, and attended the event to test that hypothesis. 
However, as CEO Oscar Mata discovered, Maker customers could create more work for 
the team and cost both time and resources:  
The unstructured chaos and the lack of competitive drive of the Maker is not our 
ideal first customer. They are actually a harder customer to handle. They are not 
as homogenous. They’re demanding. They’re critical. They question everything. 
They’re just a very difficult group, so we’re going to get there, but we’re just 
going to leave [the Maker market opportunity] alone for now. 
Joule learned new details about Makers from their experience, and from that learning 
they identified an execution gap: they had not yet planned for customer service activities. 
While they needed to fill that gap, the cost of service to these amateurs would be too 
high. Rather than expand their strategy to professional and amateur engineers, Joule 
declined to change and instead to remain focused on giving professional engineers a fun 
experience with their technology. 
In three cases, firms chose to make a strategic change but aborted change efforts 
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when an external stakeholder integral to the change process withdrew from the planned 
activities. After an international firm found Gauss through their website and then visited 
Gauss in the U.S. several times, Gauss decided to work with this partner to sell a 
variation of Gauss’s product into a foreign market. When the foreign partner 
unexpectedly stopped returning CEO Gail’s calls, Gauss aborted their strategic change of 
foreign expansion because they could not do it alone. 
While Gauss was abruptly aborted, Farad watched events unfold on the news that 
compounded to force the team to abort a choice to change their location and first market. 
Farad CEO Don Bolek has been involved in energy industry organizations for four 
decades, experience that brought him to conclude that a cleantech startup could not be 
funded by traditional startup investors such as VCs. Bolek’s alternative plan was to get a 
federal grant that would signal Farad’s potential to non-traditional investors, such as state 
agencies, and then bring together multiple smaller value investors to make Farad’s first 
round of funding. Farad’s team talked to lawyers, bankers, businessmen of all types, and 
economic development groups. One opportunity came "in the middle of buffalos... 
stampeding right around the car." A Midwest economic development office tasked with 
growing industry in their state offered Farad grants, incentives, and introductions to 
university and industry stakeholders if Farad moved an office there. Bolek and his team 
stitched together their first round funding with a federal grant, that state office, and two 
private investors, and in the summer, they signed a lease on their Midwest office, a room 
with a telephone, a garbage can, and a filing cabinet. Then in October 2013, the U.S. 
government shutdown delayed their federal grant funds and a local scandal forced the 
  
83 
governor to open an investigation into the state office Farad was working with. Bolek 
described how these two events combined froze Farad's funding: 
Originally, it was going to be that the [federal grant] puts in their money. Then 
the state was going to put in their money... Then there were two private 
investors that were each going to put in $200,000 together. So we get $800,000. 
These two guys were waiting for the state to kick in first... Now we’re worried 
about the [state] government, whether or not they’re really going to be real. Do 
they really have the money to do all this? What’s the state going to do? [Our 
private investors] were waiting now for the state to come across. They were 
getting okay with the government [shutdown]. Then the state, in order to fix this 
problem, decided … that they will then wait until the private investors go in here 
first and use them as their [signal]. 
Farad was caught in a stalemate: the state's delays worried the private investors, the 
private investors' worries marred negotiations with the state. Eventually, Farad received 
their federal grant money; however, the remaining $600K they had been promised from 
the state office and the private investors slowly disappeared as conversations stopped. 
Without the funding and state relationship, Farad had no reason to move to the Midwest 
or commit to launch with local specialized industry customers. Farad aborted their 
strategic change and carried on with their original strategy.  
Time Shift Current Strategy 
In a smaller number of cases, firms decided that while they did not want to change 
their strategy at this time, they could not dismiss the reality that a change of some kind 
might be necessary later. When they faced such a reality, the firms found ways to shift 
time rather than change their strategy. In six decisions, firms did this by extending the 
time horizon on their current strategy. In five other cases, firms extended the time they 
had to consider strategic change by deferring decision making, leaving themselves the 
option value to choose to change at a later date. 
  
84 
Ohm extended the time horizon on their current strategy when they decided to 
produce a simpler, niche product for their target customers before launching their planned 
flagship product. Late at night as the engineering team finalized their microchip design to 
be sent out for manufacture, CTO Marcone finally accepted what co-founder and 
Director of Engineering Erik Heard had been saying: their design was not working. 
Marcone worried that the firm could not continue operations or fundraising without 
achieving some sales. He described his late night idea for how to build more time into 
their schedule: 
We were like, ‘We are not going to get there because we have to do X Y and Z 
things between now and then and it has taken us this long to do A B and C 
things.’ You can't make the ends meet. So what can we do? We had all these 
pieces of working technology on our chips, and we realized that we had pretty 
much all the subcomponents we needed to make the [niche product]. We 
basically took the pieces of the stuff we'd already built, modified them just a 
little bit, slapped them all together on a chip, and sent them out the door in July. 
With a small amount of work, the team moved the niche product design forward to buy 
time for their flagship product design and not have to change their current strategy. The 
same B2B customers were interested in both the flagship product and the niche product, 
which Ohm had originally figured would be a later addition to their product portfolio. 
With earlier sales, Ohm would be able to achieve the current strategy and earn revenue, 
just in a longer time frame. 
Firms also shifted their time by deferring their decision about strategic change. 
While they may not have seen the reason to change now, they decided that they did not 
want to close off the opportunity entirely. Hartree’s CEO Beck received a large number 
of connections and cold calls from firms interested in Hartree’s engineering skills. One 
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such call was from a chemical company that a mutual contact had told about Hartree’s 
contract engineering and technical capabilities. From the chemical company, Hartree 
learned about a widespread engineering problem that Hartree’s technology could address, 
about the scale of that problem, and about a market with a high willingness to pay for a 
solution. Beck found the project interesting, both technologically and as a potential 
source of significant revenue, but, as he described, the fit was not clear:  
A large chemical company just approached us. They’re interested in our 
capability because they have a problem… they think that we might have a 
solution to their problem…  We’ve talked. It’s not exactly clear to me that we 
have the right solution, nor is it clear to them, but there’s this ongoing discussion 
that may lead to a project. The project could lead to a product that retrofits every 
chemical plant in the world with a [product we make]. It’s one of those 
interesting, odd, weird things that could be this “aha” product that you just don’t 
expect. 
Beck had not expected the product, which was not directly in line with Hartree’s current 
product portfolio strategy. Rather than just say no, Beck was drawing out his 
conversations with the chemical company on the chance that either the tradeoff between 
potential revenue and adding a new product or Hartree’s need for funding made this 
strategic change more attractive. 
Adjust To Improve 
When firms entered into decision making about strategic change, they were either 
considering embracing a new opportunity or solving a problem. Even if the firm chose 
not to change, they had learned about that opportunity or devised a problem’s solution 
that the firm could still, potentially, gain value from. In 49 decisions, the firms found 
ways to use what they had learned to reinforce and improve the likelihood of success of 
their current strategy without changing and redirecting the firm. Not long after Gauss’s 
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international expansion partner disappeared, CEO Gail learned about another large 
foreign firm that was interested in working with them. A little bit wary and in need of 
financial resources to bridge the firm until their pilot project was ready, Gail turned these 
conversations toward investment in the firm, with the potential for a foreign expansion 
project in the future. Rather than attempt a second foreign expansion change, just yet, 
Gauss turned their new relationship into financial resources that helped the firm stay on 
track. 
Joule’s founders made it a point to learn as much as they could from the cadre of 
advisers and mentors they had collected. So they acted when one of the advisers from 
their accelerator recommended that they talk to the Lumen program to get Joule’s product 
into the hands of professional engineers. After a few interactions with Lumen, Joule’s 
team learned that every Lumen site ran their operations differently and that they were not 
as focused on robotics as Joule had been led to believe. With more accurate information 
about Lumen, Joule determined that the tradeoff of effort for the Joule team and exposure 
of their products to potential customers was too small. However, after their experience 
with Lumen the Joule team looked at other programs like Lumen, and learned about the 
Franklin program, which was larger and more homogenously structured, as CEO Mata 
described:  
[Franklin programs] have a normalized structure that is very copy/paste. If we 
can get in with one then we can get in with almost all of them. They’re a little 
different and unique… They’re all using the same components… They all have 
the same budgets. They all have the same reimbursement programs. They’re on 
a list. That last one is really important. 
With the Franklin program, Joule could continue with its strategy to expose professional 
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engineers to their product, but now they could do so on a larger scale with more 
consistent experiences that would minimize the overhead for Joule’s team. Joule’s 
learning from their experience with Lumen helped them find and begin a relationship 
with Franklin that would allow them to enact their current strategy more effectively. 
For all of the decisions in this study, the firms learned new knowledge from the 
information that triggered the decision making process and the information they collected 
to help them decide. Acquired learning improved the accuracy of the firm’s knowledge, 
added details where the firm had not been aware that they did not know things, and 
refined assumptions by either supporting or opposing the beliefs previously held. Each 
firm then used that learning for appraisal during their decision making process to clarify 
their goals, to reassess their tradeoffs, and to fill execution gaps in the activities to 
achieve their strategy. With what they learned, the firms ultimately chose to carry on and 
not change their strategies, a purposeful choice to abstain from change, time shift, or 
adjust to improve the current strategy. 
Discussion 
Firms learn from engaging in decision making even when they do not make 
strategic change. With this study, I set out to understand how entrepreneurial technology 
firms in a dynamic, uncertain context learn from the process of decision-making not to 
change their strategy. This question addresses the less talked about, but more common, 
choice of entrepreneurial firms to carry on with their current strategy rather than to 
change it. Using a pooled data set of 80 strategic decisions across seven early stage 
entrepreneurial technology firms, I found that the firms learned new information that 
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augmented both the accepted information and believed assumptions that made up the 
firm’s knowledge. Firms used that refined knowledge to improve their analysis and 
reasoning in decision making so that their choice to not change their strategy was 
purposeful and productive for the firm.  
This paper contributes to literatures on organizational learning, strategic change, 
and early stage entrepreneurial firm strategy. First, this research extends our attention on 
organizational learning beyond established firms in stable contexts by examining learning 
in a dynamic, uncertain context in which believed assumptions weigh more heavily in the 
knowledge held by the firm. Second, by examining decisions for which the firm opted to 
not change their strategy, I expand our understanding of the choices that can be selected 
beyond the binary set of options: to change or to do nothing. Lastly, by examining the 
process of learning during these choices, this paper extends our understanding of how 
early stage entrepreneurial firm strategies evolve. 
Learning in a Dynamic, Uncertain Context 
Previous literature on organizational learning has focused on established firms 
who have a history of success in a stable context (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Rajagopalan 
and Spreitzer 1997). For those firms, learning means acquiring knowledge that is new: it 
did not previously exist or is different from what existed in the past. When new 
information enters a stable context, firms are likely to change their behavior or strategy to 
account for what is different (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011). Entrepreneurial firms in a 
dynamic, uncertain context act with incomplete knowledge that is a mix of accepted 
information and believed assumptions. They may learn about shifts in the environment, 
  
89 
as seen with established firms in the literature, but, as these findings demonstrate, they 
also acquire information that improves the accuracy of their knowledge, adds details 
where no information was previously known, or refines their beliefs by supporting or 
opposing their assumptions. 
Fundamental to the difference between these two scenarios, the entrepreneurial 
firm in a dynamic, uncertain context can learn new knowledge that prompts them to carry 
on with their current strategy. Because of, not despite, this new learning, the firm has 
reasons to not change its activities or strategy. My findings highlight how these firms 
accepted the new information they learned and used that new knowledge in their decision 
process to clarify their goals, reassess the tradeoffs they were making, and to fill in holes 
in their current activities. This is an important step in the framework presented here as 
this is when and how the firms used their new learning. The appraise phase is the bridge 
between acquisition of new knowledge and the outcome of learning that is missed in 
research that uses a behavioral change outcome as a proxy measurement for learning. 
Prior research has proposed that firms in a dynamic, uncertain environment could 
be economically better off if they not change their strategy. Posen and Levinthal (2012) 
found that when firms in a turbulent or dynamic and uncertain context learned new 
information they should not decide to change their strategy, even when a different 
strategy would be mathematically optimal. In their model, as in this study, when firms 
learned, they updated their stock of accepted information and refined their beliefs. 
However, in a turbulent environment the next information learned could disagree with the 
current optimized strategy, the cost of change and the lost value to knowledge related to 
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the prior strategy would need to be accounted for in optimization calculations. This logic 
could be taken as support for the view of entrepreneurs as stubborn or overconfident 
(Hayward, Shepherd, and Griffin 2006) because it implies that firms privilege their 
beliefs over incomplete information, expecting new information will eventually support 
their beliefs. In contrast, my findings show considered and purposeful knowledge-based 
reasoning in the firms’ choices to carry on rather than change their strategy. 
Purposefully Choosing to Not Change Strategy 
This study contributes to our understanding of strategic change by expanding the 
set of options available to the firm beyond the binary choice of to change or not to 
change. Prior research on strategic change has focused on questions related to when and 
why firms fail to change their strategy in the face of environmental change (Zajac and 
Shortell 1989; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997; Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Van de Ven 
and Poole 1995). In this question, strategic change is a binary option: either the firm 
changed or it did not succeed at changing. In this research, firms that did not change did 
nothing because they missed identifying that they should change or failed to enact a 
change because of internal inertial forces related to power, identity, current customers, or 
capabilities (Barr 1998; Boeker 1989; Landes 2000; Gilbert 2005; Christensen and Bower 
1996). Since this research pre-supposes that strategic change was the optimal choice for 
these firms, these studies miss the question asked here.  
Firms in this study chose among several alternative outcomes to strategic change. 
Firms that abstained from change either explicitly declined the different activities 
considered or wanted to change but had that option aborted when a necessary partner 
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withdrew. Firms that chose to time shift rather than change now either extended their 
time horizon to accomplish the current strategy or deferred decision making about 
change. In the most common category, firms found ways to use what had been considered 
for strategic change and instead made adjustments to their activities that reinforced the 
current strategy and improved its likelihood for success. In each case, the outcome was 
not a redirection or reorientation of the firm. A few studies in the technology innovation 
literature have noted how firms facing technological discontinuity have survived despite 
failing to change to match new technologies (Tripsas 1997a; Henderson 1995). Coupled 
with those studies, these findings suggest that further research is needed to understand not 
just when firms decide not to change, but also how engaging the choice to not change can 
be productive for the firm. 
Evolving Entrepreneurial Firm Strategy 
This study aligns with a call in the entrepreneurship literature to examine 
emergence in early stage firms as a process of “entrepreneurial and organizational 
learning under uncertainty” (Aldrich and Ruef Forthcoming: 21). A disproportionate 
volume of research in entrepreneurship has focused on high-growth, venture-capital 
invested firms and IPO exits, which constitute a small percentage of entrepreneurship. 
More broadly applicable research on emergence is needed to identify and correct 
conclusions from that research that may not be generalizable to all entrepreneurial firms 
(Aldrich and Ruef Forthcoming). While this paper focused on entrepreneurial firms 
developing novel technology innovations, the findings can be viewed as evidence from 
an extreme case of strategic decision making and learning under dynamic uncertainty.  
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Through longitudinal data into the early stage of these firms, this study explored 
the evolution of the firm’s strategy. By examining the explicit choice to not change firm 
strategy, these findings disentangled outcome from intent in these decisions, a necessary 
step to expanding our understanding of how firm strategies evolve. In their choice to not 
change, firms in my study declared what they would be and what they would not be. 
They often also decided what they wanted to become or did not want to become in the 
future. For example when Ergon chose to not develop their own control system software 
for the first generation of their product, they also decided that they would introduce the 
custom control system in a future product generation. While they did not change their 
strategy at that time, these findings highlight how a single choice could address multiple 
periods of time of a firm’s evolution, a decision about the current strategy and the 
strategy in a later phase. Marx and Hsu (2015) proposed a framework involving similar 
multiple period strategic decisions through “strategic switchbacks” or temporary 
strategies selected to enable firms to eventually enact their ideal strategy. Future research 
should further examine the longitudinal nature of entrepreneurial firm strategic decisions 
and how the immediate outcome of a strategic decision might differ from the long-term 
intent of the firm, setting the stage for future actions and strategy development. 
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NAVIGATING MISALIGNMENT: HOW ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 
MANAGE THE CHALLENGES OF PARTNERING WITH ESTABLISHED 
FIRMS 
Entrepreneurial firms developing new technology knowledge to create or disrupt 
markets face significant uncertainty (McMullen and Shepherd 2006; Aldrich and Ruef 
Forthcoming). One way for them to mitigate some of that uncertainty is to partner with an 
established firm (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). Established firms who do not want to be left behind 
by discontinuous technological change but do not have the capabilities or the willingness 
to take the risk on whether or not this innovation will bring that change can be motivated 
partners (Cozzolino and Rothaermel 2018). Yet, while both firms may believe in the 
future of this technology development, in the present, the entrepreneurial firm needs to 
manage the challenges of partnering under high uncertainty and from a position of low 
power. 
Starting with Schumpeter (1934) and continuing through classic (Tushman and 
Anderson 1986; Utterback and Suárez 1993; Christensen 1997) and more recent work 
(Eggers and Park 2018; Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2002; Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon 2008) 
on creative destruction and technology change, innovation research has touted the role of 
entrepreneurial firms in developing new technology knowledge and novel innovations. 
Yet, the same firms willing to bear risk and uncertainty to create new technology 
innovations (Wu and Knott 2006; McMullen and Shepherd 2006) are under-resourced, 
prone to failure, and, as such, considered weak (Stinchcombe 1965; Aldrich and Yang 
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2012). However, recent research that has taken the perspective of the entrepreneurial 
firms has begun to show that, while weaker, entrepreneurial technology firms are not 
powerless in their relationships with more established firms (Graebner and Eisenhardt 
2004; Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt 2008; Santos and Eisenhardt 2009). As owners 
and developers of technology with the potential for creative destruction, these 
entrepreneurial firms do have some power. This research further explores what power 
entrepreneurial firms developing new technology knowledge hold and how these firms 
manage power asymmetry when partnering with established firms. 
A long history of research on alliances has developed recommendations for how 
best to design a partnership to maximize the chances for success and minimize 
opportunism for the goals and partners involved (Gulati and Singh 1998; Panico 2017; 
Lerner and Merges 2003; Kale and Singh 2009). Firms collaborating on uncertain 
technology development need to both be committed to the goal, for which they should 
share equity in the result to insure alignment and deter opportunism. Also, they should 
contract clear roles and processes to coordinate their actions and continued alignment 
(Gulati and Singh 1998; Kale and Singh 2009). However in this context, where the 
greatest value asset the entrepreneurial firm has is its technology, their key concern will 
be to retain control and ownership of their technology and will focus on defending 
against misappropriation of their IP by their partner. While the established firm, who sees 
enough uncertainty in this technology to be unwilling to invest the resources to develop it 
internally, will be willing to commit only a small amount of resources and will be 
unwilling to waste resources on too many formal controls. Research has shown that high 
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uncertainty combined with asymmetry between partners can lead to non-optimized 
partnership structures (Aghion and Tirole 1994; Grossman and Hart 1986) as well as with 
tensions that corrode the interactions between the firms and challenge partnership success 
(Doz 1987). 
In this paper, I examine how these entrepreneurial firms manage the challenges of 
partnering with established firms to develop their new technology innovations. I address 
this research question through a longitudinal field study of five entrepreneurial-
established firm partnerships created to support new technology development at an 
entrepreneurial firm in the energy and cleantech sector. I found that when designing their 
partnerships, the firms structured an option value arrangement that addressed each firm’s 
key concerns: misappropriation of IP for the entrepreneurial firm and risk for the 
established firm. The established firm provided financial resources in return for a future 
option value of first mover exclusivity with the technology but no equity, while the 
entrepreneurial firm retained full ownership and control of the technology development. 
During the partnership, when the established firm took actions that challenged their 
success, the entrepreneurial firm managed those challenges by using one or more of four 
strategies: 1) wait, 2) explore outside options, 3) resolve specific challenge content, and 
4) address the established firm’s motivations. The result of these managing strategies was 
either that the established firm realigned its commitment to the partnership or the 
entrepreneurial firm terminated the relationship.  
This research contributes to the entrepreneurship and alliances literatures. By 
studying entrepreneurial-established firm partnerships through a longitudinal field study, 
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this research extends our understanding of how partners act within the governance and 
control structures more often studied. Furthermore, by taking the perspective of the 
entrepreneurial firm, this study expands our understanding of the managing strategies that 
the less powerful partner can take, and to what avail. To that point, by examining the 
entrepreneurial firm not as an R&D supplier to the established firm but as a partner, this 
research broadens our view into how entrepreneurial and established firms can work 
together toward technology change. 
Theoretical Background 
Both established incumbents and entrepreneurial technology firms use 
partnerships to support themselves through new innovations and technology change. 
They enter partnerships to pool complementary resources and capabilities to achieve 
economic efficiency and share risk (Teece 1986; Rothaermel and Boeker 2008; 
Hagedoorn 1993) or to learn from each other so that they can operate on their own in the 
future (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005b). Regardless of their 
goals or the division of resources and capabilities, partnering firms find themselves in a 
co-opetitive situation in which each firm will angle to maximize their own value capture 
from the partnership (Panico 2017). So that they can successfully walk the line between 
cooperating and competing, research has examined how firms should manage governing 
not only the actions taken in their partnership but also each partner’s commitment and 
trust (Kale and Singh 2009; Gulati and Singh 1998).  
Entrepreneurial firms developing new innovations with the potential to bring 
technological change are motivated to partner with established firms for financial 
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resources, risk sharing, and to gain legitimacy for themselves and their innovations 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Stuart 1998). Into these partnerships, entrepreneurial 
firms bring their technology and their R&D capabilities. Even though entrepreneurial 
firms contribute the linchpin technology content to these partnerships, the established 
firm holds a more powerful position as the financial resource provider. As Aghion and 
Tirole (1994), Lerner and Merges (2003), and others have warned, R&D efforts are 
optimized when the developing firm retains property rights; yet, in practice, R&D 
contracts are often not optimized due to cash constraints and power held by the firm 
contributing financial resources. In this context, that could mean that the entrepreneurial 
firm will find itself competing with their established firm partner rather than cooperating, 
unless they can find a well matched partner and design a well governed contract (Pisano 
1990). This is not to say that these entrepreneurial firms are powerless. Recent work 
examining entrepreneurial-established firm partnerships from the entrepreneurial firm’s 
perspective has shown that when the entrepreneurial firm retains control of their 
technology they can shape creation of nascent markets and gain value from cooperative 
partnerships with established firms  (Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt 2008; Santos 
and Eisenhardt 2009). 
As holders of financial resources, complementary assets, and current market 
power, the established firms that enter these partnerships could have developed these 
technologies themselves (Schumpeter 1942; Eggers and Park 2018). However, when 
technology uncertainty is high and development would require a significant amount of 
time and capital, established firms will not be sufficiently motivated to internalize 
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development. Teece (1986) concisely summarized this decision for the established firm: 
if the time required is long and the investment required is major “Forget It” and contract 
for access to the technology from the innovator that successfully develops it. Unlike in a 
traditional integrated procurement process (Aghion and Tirole 1994), in this context the 
entrepreneurial firm has already initiated its own technology development efforts that the 
established firm then discovers and identifies as valuable to their own future. In this way, 
these partnerships differ from a customer-research unit contract R&D arrangement 
because the entrepreneurial firm enters with ownership of the technology IP asset, which 
they are motivated to retain. 
Technology R&D collaborations involve a significant amount of uncertainty that 
firms cannot fully contract against (Kloyer and Scholderer 2012; Lerner and Merges 
2003); however, the long history of the alliances literature does have recommendations 
for partnering firms. In their review of the alliances literature, Kale and Singh (2009) 
summarized the key recommendations for strategic alliance management and success. 
First, before the partnership, firms should select their partners carefully for 
complementarity of resources and capabilities, commitment to the relationship and its 
goal, and compatibility of working style and culture. Partner commitment is especially 
critical when the partners have a clear identification of the value they aim to create with 
their partnership but uncertainty about how to achieve that value. Second, in structuring 
the governance of their partnerships, firms facing high uncertainty are recommended to 
share equity in the outcome to insure commitment and protect against opportunistic 
actions. Alternatively, the firms can use contractual provisions to delineate rights, 
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responsibilities, roles, and dispute resolution processes; however, contracting adds to 
both the financial and organizational costs to partner and cannot be complete under high 
uncertainty. If the firms trust each other, they could substitute some of these controls with 
relational governance and trust that their partner will not act opportunistically. During the 
partnership, the partnering firms should coordinate their actions based on their agreed 
upon roles and processes, which can be done through programmed guidelines for tasks, 
hierarchical management, or structured feedback.  
While these recommendations present an idealized structure for interfirm 
alliances, partnering firms may each face different types of uncertainties or may differ in 
their priorities and goals for the partnership in which case the recommendations for 
governance and structure can conflict (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). Entrepreneurial 
technology firms whose most valuable asset is their technology will first and foremost be 
concerned about whether their partnership governance protects them from 
misappropriation of that technology IP. While sharing equity may motivate commitment 
from their established firm partner, the entrepreneurial firm will need to weigh the value 
of that commitment against the loss of ownership and a possibility that the established 
firm will learn what it needs to design around the entrepreneurial firm and take the 
technology to market alone (Alvarez and Barney 2001). Furthermore, for an established 
firm facing uncertainty about whether the technology under development will or will not 
initiate technology change in their industry, the recommended hierarchical controls and 
coordination could come at too high a cost of resources and time to make the partnership 
worthwhile. In that situation, the established firm may prefer the less costly approach of 
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relational governance and trust, even though it will only provide low to moderate control 
over freeriding or other undesirable actions by their partner (Das and Teng 2001). 
Regardless of how well the firms structure their partnership, they are likely to 
experience challenges that could jeopardize successful completion of their goals (Ryall 
and Sampson 2009; Oxley 1997). In fact, given the conflicting recommendations for how 
to design their partnership under uncertainty, they may experience challenges born from 
the structures that they selected to prevent other challenges (Poppo and Zenger 2002). In 
that case, the partnering firms will need strategies for managing challenges during their 
partnership to insure successful development of the technology in the end. While research 
on entrepreneurial-established firm partnerships has examined how these partnerships can 
improve outcomes for the entrepreneurial firm (e.g. Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 
2000; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004; Davis 2016; Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009; Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven 1996; Moghaddam, Bosse, and Provance 2016; Shan, Walker, and 
Kogut 1994), less is understood about how entrepreneurial firms manage the partnerships 
themselves. Both firms want the partnership to succeed; however, the entrepreneurial 
firm will be more effected since their core value is the technology under development and 
they could experience dire consequences to their survival from challenges to the 
partnership. As the less powerful partner facing not only uncertainty about their 
technology but also uncertainty about their survival, the entrepreneurial firm will have a 
greater need to manage these challenges yet be in a weaker position to do so. To this end, 
this research examines how entrepreneurial firms developing new technology innovations 
manage the challenges of partnering with established firms. 
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Research Methods 
This paper developed out of an inductive, longitudinal field study of several early 
stage entrepreneurial firms developing novel technology innovations in energy and 
cleantech. The data was collected to examine the strategy and technology evolution of 
entrepreneurial firms developing novel innovations using new technology knowledge. 
Such firms face significant uncertainties as a consequence of their technology 
development in addition to the uncertainties inherent in entrepreneurship (McMullen and 
Shepherd 2006). One way that these entrepreneurial firms address the uncertainties they 
face is through partnerships (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 
2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). As such, I examined the partnerships 
represented in the data. I identified within this data a set of entrepreneurial-established 
firm partnerships that I then examined to understand how the entrepreneurial technology 
firms managed the challenges of partnering with established firms. 
Research Setting 
This research examines early stage entrepreneurial firms in energy and cleantech 
developing novel hardware innovations from new technology knowledge. I selected this 
setting because it is a sector fraught with high financial and technological uncertainties 
for which the firms are seeking assistance from external stakeholders. Unlike the high-
growth technology ventures most commonly addressed in the entrepreneurship literature 
(Aldrich and Ruef Forthcoming), entrepreneurial firms founded on novel hard-science 
and technology knowledge face longer development periods and lower return on 
investment multiples for their funders (Mowery, Nelson, and Martin 2010; Hargadon and 
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Kenney 2012). Because of these factors, these firms are less attractive to independent 
venture capital investors whose funds tend to have a ten year schedule, for which they 
must invest in ventures likely to have a liquidity event within that shorter time horizon 
(Gompers and Lerner 2004). Since 2010, venture capital investment interest in this sector 
has decreased drastically, and those investors still interested in this sector have focused 
on later stage firms at or near profitability (Saha and Muro 2017). Consequently, these 
early stage hard-science and technology ventures seek financial and other resources from 
non-VC sources such as angel investors, “family funds,” government and NGO grants, 
and “strategics” (corporate strategic investors).  
Currently, in the energy and cleantech sector many entrepreneurial firms are 
developing novel innovations from new and recombined technology knowledge to 
address global issues of energy efficiency, sustainability, pollution, and energy 
generation (Mowery, Nelson, and Martin 2010; Nanda, Younge, and Fleming 2015). 
These issues are considered among the grand challenges that nations and firms are 
addressing on behalf of society (George et al. 2016). Technologies that successfully 
address grand challenges have the potential to disrupt or create industries, as all firms 
with related technologies may be expected to adopt the new technology either by 
regulation or market preference. For that reason, established technology firms are taking 
various roles in the development of these technologies: as innovating pioneers, investors, 
partners, and observers (e.g. Nanda, Younge, and Fleming 2015; Hargadon 2010; 
Pacheco, York, and Hargrave 2014; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a).  
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Data Collection 
This three entrepreneurial firm sample was compiled through introductions made 
by the researcher’s university network of entrepreneurs. All firms were located in the 
Boston metropolitan area at the time of entry to the study. Founders were approached by 
email or in person and asked to participate in a field based research study on how 
entrepreneurial firms in nascent technology industries navigate strategic change. 
Additionally, they were told that each firm would be kept unidentifiable in presentation 
and publication of the research. To this end, all firm and informant names presented are 
pseudonyms and details about the technologies and products under development are 
disguised.  
All three firms were founded to commercialize novel technology hardware and 
create a new market or replace an existing technology. The sample of firms founded 
between 2009 and 2010 includes several technology areas within the energy and 
cleantech sector: power generation and storage (Coulomb); energy efficiency of electrical 
systems (Ohm); and pollution (Ergon). All firm founding teams had educations and 
backgrounds in engineering: two with prior startup experience and one recently graduated 
students.   
I conducted 60 semi-structured interviews across the three firms during which I 
probed founders and team members about strategic decisions that affected the firm’s 
strategy. I interviewed the founding entrepreneurs, top management team, board 
members, engineers, investors, and other advisors involved in strategic decisions at each 
firm. Introductory interviews began with the informant generating a list of strategic 
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decisions that he or she deemed impactful for the firm. I considered strategic decisions to 
be related “to the long-term prospects of the company” and have a “critical influence on 
its success or failure” (Agarwal and Helfat 2009: 281). During initial interviews, 
informants were asked to discuss as many impactful strategic decisions as time allowed. 
Follow-up interviews explored how previously identified strategic decisions evolved as 
well as new strategic decisions that had since emerged. Interviews averaged 75 minutes 
in length and all interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
Interviews were conducted over a one to five-year period (depending on firm 
entry and exit to the study) to capture the evolution of firm strategy while decisions and 
recollections were contemporary. Firms entered the study at different times between the 
second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2015. Ohm entered the study a year earlier 
than the other firms as part of a pilot to test the research design. Two firms (Coulomb and 
Ohm) volunteered to continue in the study on an ongoing basis after the originally agreed 
upon study period. Table 6 provides an overview of the firms as well as information 
about interviews and informants at each firm. I augmented interview data with 24 onsite 
observations coinciding with interviews held at the firms’ offices and 38 internal and 
external documents, including board presentations, articles and videos about the firms 
and the founders, and stakeholder communications provided by informants to confirm the 
timing of key events. 
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Table 6: Description of Entrepreneurial Firms and Data Collection 
Firm Founded Technology Period in 
Study 
Months 
in Study 
Interview 
Count 
Interviews with 
Coulomb 2009 Manufacturing 
Process 
late 2013 – 
early 2018 
54 16 Co-Founder, CEO 
Co-Founder, Engineering 
Lead 
Co-Founder, Advisor 
Engineering Project Manager 
Dir Operations & 
Development 
Ergon 2010 Chemical 
Process 
early 2014 
– late 2014 
9 5 Co-Founder, CEO 
Co-Founder, VP Sales &   
      Business Development 
Ohm 2010 Electronic 
Component 
mid 2012 
– late 2017 
64 39 Co-Founder, CEO 
Co-Founder, CTO 
Co-Founder, Dir 
Manufacturing  
      & Ops 
VP Sales & Marketing 
Program Manager (1) 
Program Manager (2) 
Dir Engineering 
Development 
Senior Principal Engineer 
Principal Engineer 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis was a three phase inductive and iterative theory building process. In 
the first phase, I identified the partnerships within the data in which the entrepreneurial 
firms formally contracted (Ohm-Pascal, Coulomb-Foe, Ergon-Bohr, and Ergon-Henry), 
or were in the process of formally contracting (Coulomb-Volt), with established firms in 
their industry. I excluded three partnerships mentioned in the data because the partnership 
had not yet progressed beyond introductory meetings (Ohm-Mole and Coulomb-Rad) or 
because the partnership had not been discussed in the data beyond mention of its 
existence (Ergon-Cal). The five partnerships examined are summarized in Table 7.   
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Table 7: Description of Entrepreneurial-Established Firm Partnerships 
Partnerships 
Studied 
Type of EST Exclusivity 
Agreement 
Challenges Status 
Ohm – 
Pascal 
Customer 1 year EST shifts delays (2) 
EST shifts strategic priorities 
EST added requirements midway 
(3) 
Terminated 
Coulomb – 
Foe 
Supplier ongoing unless 
no sales for 6 
months 
EST shifts delays 
EST misrepresented relationship 
to outside stakeholder 
Terminated 
Coulomb – 
Volt 
Customer not contracted EST shifts delays 
EST reversed commitment to 
transact 
In negotiations 
Ergon – Bohr Supplier restricted list EST shifts delay Option Converted 
to Sales Contract 
Ergon – 
Henry 
Manufacturer 
& Distributor 
2 years EST shifts delay Option Converted 
to Sales Contract 
 
In the second phase of analysis, I used open coding to identify structures, actions 
taken, motivations, and outcomes for the five partnerships. I coded the partnership 
structures by identifying the roles and responsibilities, decision and control rights, and 
ownership assigned to each firm as well as resources and efforts contributed by each 
firm. I also coded information that signaled firm motivations and expectations for the 
partnership. Lastly, I coded any information relating to the firms’ strategies including and 
external to the partnership. Since interviews were held only with members from the 
entrepreneurial firms, information about the motives, expectations, and strategies of the 
established firms were inferred from second hand statements made by members of the 
established firms to people at their entrepreneurial firm partners and from actions taken 
by the established firms. For example, Ergon CEO Tad David described how he 
understood Bohr’s reasons for restarting and renegotiating their contract after their initial 
negotiations were nearly complete:  
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They were somewhat apologetic about it, but in the end, unmovable in that 
“Yes, we know that we negotiated that and now we’re saying this, but sorry, we 
have to do this.” I think, between the lines, what I was reading is that there was a 
big scandal internally in that the counsel [who] guided the first negotiation 
process was booted.  
From this statement, I coded that Bohr’s motive for shifting the schedule related to 
strategic and operational issues outside of the partnership. Additionally, I used the 
difference between specific contract details that David described in each of the two 
negotiations, relating to exclusivity rights and investments to be made by Bohr, to 
identify and code changes in Bohr’s expectations and motives for the partnership. The 
specific contracts were never attained among the documents collected; therefore, only 
those details described in interviews or referred to in other internal and external 
documents could be used to code partnership structures. 
From the second phase of analysis, I identified a set of structural characteristics 
consistent across the five partnerships. First, the entrepreneurial firms retained 
development control and complete ownership of the technology. Second, the established 
firms provided financial resources even though they were not granted equity in either the 
entrepreneurial firms or the technology, instead they received an option value for future 
exclusivity for a sales contract with the entrepreneurial firm. 
In the third phase of analysis, I examined each partnership for instances in which 
the firms were in conflict. I coded an established firm challenge as an instance in which 
the actions of the established firm interrupted and negatively impacted the continued 
success of the partnership by impeding the entrepreneurial firm’s development activities 
or financial stability. For example, when Bohr restarted and renegotiated their partnership 
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contract with Ergon, the established firm’s actions added several months to the process 
and delayed transfer of financial resources to the entrepreneurial firm. I identified twelve 
challenges initiated by the established firm across the five partnerships. Additional 
challenges from technological development and resource availability were also identified 
but were expected by both firms as part of the risks and uncertainty of new technology 
development and are not explored deeper in this paper. Such technological and financial 
challenges were primarily managed through engineering development and fund raising 
efforts and did not significantly affect partner interactions beyond being points of 
discussion. After I identified the established firm challenges in these partnerships, I 
examined the antecedents that led up to the established firms’ actions and the ensuing 
entrepreneurial firms’ reactions. In comparing the data across challenges and 
partnerships, I focused on developing a theoretical framework that could explain how the 
entrepreneurial firms managed the challenges. 
Designing the Partnership  
The entrepreneurial firms in the partnerships in this study managed the challenges 
of partnering at two stages: 1) designing their partnership and 2) during the partnership. 
They designed their partnerships to motivate both firms based on each firm’s key 
concerns: for the entrepreneurial firm the concern of misappropriation of their technology 
IP, for the established firm the concern of taking on risk on an uncertain technology. 
Each firm had their immediate concerns addressed and gained an option value for the 
future. In the near term, the entrepreneurial firm gained funding without giving up any 
ownership or control of their new technology development and, for the longer term, 
  
109 
gained option values of a first customer or supplier and a potential future acquirer. The 
established firm risked relatively few resources now for future option values to be a first 
mover in the new technology and a potential future owner of the entrepreneurial firm and 
its technology.  
Motivating the Entrepreneurial Firm 
The entrepreneurial technology firms in this study understood clearly that their 
most valuable asset was their technology IP. To be motivated to partner with an 
established firm at such an early stage of technology development, the entrepreneurial 
firm needed a structure that would protect them from misappropriation of their IP. To that 
end, they structured their partnerships to provide funding for technology development by 
the entrepreneurial firm without giving the established firm any equity ownership or 
opportunity to learn about the technology IP until after development was complete. After 
the technology was developed, the firms could convert the option value of their 
partnership into a contract for sales of the technology product with the established firm as 
either customer or supplier to the entrepreneurial firm. The entrepreneurial firms also saw 
an additional option value in the potential to be acquired by the established firm, which 
would produce a financial exit for the entrepreneurial firm’s owners. 
For the entrepreneurial technology firms, these partnerships first and foremost 
provided funding necessary to complete development of the new technology and new 
market innovations that they were founded to commercialize. Given the high capital 
requirements and long schedules needed to develop their technology innovations for 
commercialization, the entrepreneurial firms in this study explored a variety of funding 
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sources including venture capital, angel investors, government grants, family investment 
funds, and corporate strategic investors. Each firm had funded their operations using at 
least two different types of funding sources, and every firm had explored each type at 
some point since founding. At the initiation of each partnership, the entrepreneurial firm 
had a high need for funding and would have been unable to continue operations in the 
current strategy got long without additional financial resources. 
Ohm acquired their first influx of funding through a traditional equity investment 
round of $1.8M from a venture capital and a super angel syndicate. Over the next two 
years, when technology and product development did not progress as quickly or as 
efficiently as the team had hoped, Ohm went back to their original investors three times 
for additional funds. In the spring of 2013, with a dwindling bank account and the 
realization of a significant problem in the development schedule for one of their two 
products, Ohm cut back on their expenses, cancelled one of their products, and laid off a 
few members of their team to save money. Ohm knew that equity investors would not be 
willing to contribute to a new financing round with their technology development 
incomplete and little customer feedback to demonstrate market traction. Thus, they began 
conversations with several established firms who might be interested in becoming not 
only customers but partners willing to contribute financially to the technology 
development.   
By the time Ohm and Pascal signed their partnership agreement, Ohm had less 
money in their bank account than the firm normally spent in salaries and operating costs 
in one month. Through this agreement, Pascal provided funds to Ohm at a moment of 
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dire need and gave them the market traction evidence the entrepreneurial firm needed to 
attract others funders as well. As CEO Cam Fahey explained, Ohm went from nearly cash 
out to planning for future equity financing:  
We were just about out of money when they funded. I think we had $80,000 in 
cash, which is not very much given how much we burn. Now [3 months later] 
we’ve just opened an investment round for small investors, kind of friends and 
family underneath some of our other large investors. We’re looking to raise 
about $2 million through that over the next quarter. That plus the Pascal stuff 
would carry us through the summer. At that point, we’ll be a lot further along 
and we expect to raise probably a $10 million B round. 
Without the financial component of their partnership with Pascal, Ohm might have ended 
operations that fall. With Pascal’s funding, Ohm was again a viable venture that could be 
attractive to equity investors. 
As pioneers of new technology knowledge, these entrepreneurial firms knew that 
their most valuable asset was their technology IP. With every choice, whether related to 
funding or strategy, they believed that they needed to retain control and ownership of 
their technology if they were going to capture value as a firm or make money on an exit 
as a founder. As Ergon CEO Tad David explained:  
There are all kinds of things that you can do that will ruin your exit, especially 
around intellectual property. You have to be very smart when it comes to 
intellectual property. They’re irreversible all of these things, the IP things. They 
don’t cost a lot of money to do things right or to do things wrong, but they’re 
irreversible. They have very long-term consequences. You have to be realistic. 
Good chances are that if you are going to be valued well, part of it is going to be 
because you have IP. Don’t do something stupid with your IP is basically the 
thing. This falls under that category. Let’s not be stupid about giving away our 
IP or locking it up in some way that makes it useless. 
To be willing to participate in a partnership with an established firm, especially a firm 
with a commercial interest in their technology, the entrepreneurial firms needed to insure 
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that their IP was safe from misappropriation. Given the early stage of development for 
each firm’s technology, they often felt that they could not rely solely on patents for 
defense against misappropriation of their technology. Therefore, these partnerships were 
explicitly designed so that the established firm learned as little as possible about the 
technology under development. If the established firm learned too much about the 
technology, they might be able to design around any patents the entrepreneurial firm held 
and wipe out the firm’s value. 
To insure against misappropriation of their technology IP, the firms structured 
their partnerships so that the established firm partner only got as close to the technology 
as was necessary. For Ergon’s relationship with Bohr, a supplier that would produce 
Ergon’s core chemical component, the entrepreneurial firm relied on patents, which in 
this context could be clearly defined and defended in court. However, in their relationship 
with Henry, a manufacturer and distributor that would produce and sell Ergon’s machine 
product, Ergon never disclosed the chemical structure of their core technology and 
arranged for Henry to receive modules with the chemical already inside. Ergon Co-
founder Ian Roth called it: “Ergon technology inside. It’s so important that they have to 
buy the cartridges from us for this machine.” With both partnerships, Ergon was only 
willing to work with the established firm if their technology IP asset was controlled and 
defended.  
For Coulomb and their manufacturer partner Foe, the two engineering teams split 
the detailed design work on the machine so that Coulomb’s engineers would design the 
modules that directly involved their new technology IP and Foe’s team the modules that 
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they had prior experience producing. As Coulomb CEO Jim Allen described, while Foe 
focused on modules they had done before, both firms used the opportunity to improve 
their designs:  
We started focusing on the things that are the most different, which are [the 
modules involving our new technology], and I think they are interested in, 
although they have a design for the [beta component], I think they're interested 
in using this an excuse to redesign that. 
Even with a division of labor that kept Foe separate from design work on the new 
technology, as a manufacturer building the new machines, Foe would be co-developer 
and manufacturer of the full machine. As Jim Allen explained, the partnership contract 
defined Foe’s limited rights to sell the full machine because it included Coulomb’s 
technology IP: 
They get to produce the machines and sell them to the [customers] but they can 
only sell them to [customers] that have done license agreements with us for the 
technology. There is a bunch of fine print in order to get all of the IP patent 
exhaustion issues taken care of, but basically they're not allowed to build these 
machines in general. The only time they're allowed to build a machine is when a 
[customer] has done a license agreement to us and then they turn around and get 
to source the machine from [Foe]. 
Coulomb used modularity as their defense against IP misappropriation during the design 
phase of the partnership. Then, once the firms converted their option value into sales 
contracts and production of the machines, the entrepreneurial firm would be protected by 
their patents and contract requirements. 
Along with the immediate value that the entrepreneurial firms gained from these 
partnerships, they also gained an option value for the future: a relationship with a 
potential acquirer.  As new technology firms developing hardware in the energy and 
cleantech sector, these firms knew they were unlikely candidates for an IPO. As Ergon 
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CEO Tad David described it, while an IPO was possible for an entrepreneur like himself, 
expecting one was naïve:  
What is probability of an IPO? How many companies get IPOs? Of those that 
have successful exits, the IPOs are a single-digit percentage. You have to be 
honest with yourself about it. If you go into this and say, “My exit strategy is an 
IPO,” that’s great. It sounds very heroic, but that to me is even higher on the 
bulls--t [expletive] factor. That’s unadulterated bulls--t [expletive] to say that 
that is your exit strategy.  I’m not saying it can’t happen. It can happen. It may 
actually happen for Ergon. However, for me to stand up in front of investors and 
say, “My exit strategy is that we’re going to have an IPO,” at best it’s naïve. If I 
really mean that, then I’m naïve. 
For these firms an acquisition was a much more likely financial exit than an IPO. As 
such, the entrepreneurial firms needed to be both on the lookout for potential acquirers 
and careful to keep themselves attractive to them. As Tad David described, Ergon needed 
to provide value now but not so much that they closed the door for later:  
There’s another piece, which is we think about our exit strategy. Eventually, 
[Bohr] might be a very good candidate to buy our company, but why would they 
buy our company if they already have what they want? We need to make sure 
they don’t have it, at least not in the full form, so that they have a good reason to 
write a big check in three or five years to buy us out. This is a big decision that 
we’re facing now. 
In point of fact, any established firm in their value chain was a potential target acquirer 
for these entrepreneurial firms. By partnering with them now, and constructing their 
partnerships well, the entrepreneurial firms created an opportunity to demonstrate their 
value to the established firm concretely and before a competing firm began a relationship 
that could complicate an acquisition. 
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Motivating the Established Firm 
The established firms in these partnerships either did not have sufficient 
motivation or technology capability to take on the risks and uncertainty of this 
technology development themselves; however, they also did not want to lose out if the 
technology eventually made a significant impact on their industry. As such, the 
established firms in these partnerships only committed a relatively small amount of 
financial or human resources while the technology was still uncertain. For their small 
resource commitment, the established firms received option values that they could chose 
to convert in the future, if they deemed the technology and entrepreneurial firm valuable 
enough once technology development was completed. The primary option value that the 
established firms purchased was the option for first mover advantage, to be the first 
customer or supplier of the entrepreneurial firm for some period of exclusivity. The 
second option value was a potentially preferred position as a future acquirer of the 
entrepreneurial firm and its technology. 
Whether a supplier or a customer, when they contracted into this partnership the 
established firm purchased an option value to be the first in their role to contract with the 
entrepreneurial firm on sales of the technology. In exchange for capital, the established 
firms received no equity or ownership in the entrepreneurial firm or their technology. 
Instead they received an option for exclusivity once the technology was ready for 
commercial sales. See Table 7 for the specific exclusivity arrangements made in each 
partnership. Ohm CEO Cam Fahey summarized their arrangement with Pascal in these 
terms: “They’re giving us $5 million over the next 18 months in exchange for an 
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exclusivity period with them for the [product in their market]… They’re the only 
[customer in their market] that can use it for a period in exchange for giving us some 
development funds.” 
Ergon CEO Tad David summarized their arrangement with Bohr in somewhat 
more Faustian terms: “This is me, basically, getting free capital in return for this license. 
That’s kind of a deal with the devil.” While Ohm partnered with a customer in a clearly 
defined market, Ergon’s partnership with supplier Bohr could give their partner too much 
power over the entrepreneurial firm if not well defined and contracted. David described 
how Ergon defined the exclusivity element of their arrangement with Bohr so that Bohr 
gained value without taking value away from Ergon:  
Here are the main pieces I insisted on: one of them is that they cannot sell it to 
what I call “excluded customers” … “Excluded” means anybody who is or was 
a customer of ours is excluded and also by chain.  Basically they can’t sell it to 
somebody’s who is going to sell it to somebody who was a customer of ours… 
The other thing is that they cannot sell to any kind of company that is infringing 
on any of our IP… Once you’re put on the list, it automatically generates a 
process that they can’t do it. The third thing is that when they sell to a third party 
that are authorized, they have to pay me royalty.  That royalty, we have to 
determine what it is. I may not have a problem with them selling to a third party 
if I end up with the royalty  
Once Bohr became the first supplier of the core chemical component to Ergon’s 
technology, Bohr would be in a powerful position as the only source if Ergon succeeded 
at creating their new market. To motivate their partner, Ergon needed to insure that Bohr 
gained value even if the entrepreneurial firm failed. The licensing provision of their 
agreement insured that Bohr was protected and could capture value as the first supplier of 
the chemical without being completely tied to Ergon’s fate. 
For the value that they were in position to capture, the established firms in these 
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partnerships paid a relatively low price. These established firms were incumbent, 
successful organizations with annual revenues in the tens of billions of dollars. For these 
firms, the few million dollars that they were committing to these partnerships were small 
scale; whereas, to the entrepreneurial firms, these same denominations were life line 
funds. Furthermore, as they were only purchasing an option value at this stage of the 
technology, the established firms were not contributing the full price of development. As 
Ohm CEO Cam Fahey described, for putting up a third of the development costs spread 
out over an initial payment and four milestone installments, Pascal was getting a good 
deal: “It is a $15 million dollar program and they’re paying for $5 million of it. They’re 
paying for a third of it, and they’re getting a year of exclusivity in the first product that 
we’re building.” 
On a longer time scale than their sales contract, the established firm also gained 
an implicit option value, and a potentially preferred position, as a possible future acquirer 
of the entrepreneurial firm and the technology. While these firms had concluded that they 
did not want to do the development work themselves at this stage of technological 
uncertainty, they did see the value of internalizing the technology if and when the risks 
were removed. The established firms demonstrated their interest in future acquisition in 
both explicit and subtle ways. Coulomb CEO Jim Allen described how their first 
conversation with another established firm, Rad, started with a joke about acquisition: 
“The CEO of Rad, like the first time we met her... She said, ‘You're building us a 
company to buy, right?’ – which is kind of funny.” Allen also noted that Volt often 
included the firm’s acquisition team in their meetings:  
  
118 
Certainly Volt had their acquisition person on the phone at some of our calls. I 
think Volt would have been happy to buy us if that had been our goal, but we 
made it clear that we were going for this opportunity. I think they would be 
happy to buy us if this goes well. We also made sure that we had the exits right 
so that we're able to get competition in there, that at some point it could be that 
Foe’s competitors buys us or something like that, on the [supplier] side... we 
could play king maker among the [B2B customers], but we would prefer to 
impact the whole industry. 
Given the significant value creation impact that Coulomb’s technology posed, both 
financially and towards global sustainability, a vertically integrated customer who 
acquired Coulomb could lock their competitors out and become “king”. As current 
partners, each established firm that entered into one of these partnerships was in a 
position to, at the very least, not be shut out entirely while someone else became “king”. 
Managing Challenges during the Partnership 
The firms in these partnerships designed their structures to prepare for uncertainty 
and motivate both firms so that each was aligned toward successful development and 
commercialization of the new technology. Despite their design efforts, challenges 
materialized during the partnership. As the established firms became misaligned from 
their partners, they took actions that interrupted and negatively impacted the continued 
success of the partnership by impeding the entrepreneurial firm’s development activities 
or financial stability. The established firms in this study challenged their partnerships in 
several ways by shifting the schedule, shifting their own priorities, or acting against their 
partnership agreement. When the established firm challenged the partnership, the 
entrepreneurial firms used one or more of four managing strategies to resolve the 
challenge: 1) wait, 2) explore outside options, 3) resolve specific challenge content, or 4) 
address established firm’s motivations. A challenge was resolved either when the 
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established firm became realigned with the partnership and returned to productive actions 
or the entrepreneurial firm opted to terminate the partnership. This process is summarized 
in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: How Entrepreneurial Firms Manage Established Firm Partnering Challenges 
 
Over time, some established firms evolved their strategies in ways that decreased 
the value of this technology product and therefore of this partnership to the firm. Eight 
months into their partnership with Ohm and just as the second development milestone 
approached, Pascal reorganized management across their entire organization. As part of 
this process, which was completely external to this partnership, Pascal changed all of the 
personnel managing the business unit that Ohm interacted with and with this 
reorganization changed the priorities and focus of those people who would approve the 
partnership milestone. Ohm CEO Cam Fahey described how Pascal’s reorganization 
appeared to affect the team’s focus:  
Pascal had a massive reorg. The [second] milestone was supposed to be April 
1st, and they needed to push it back a month because they were reorganizing 
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their whole structure. All their executives are shifting to the new role April 1st 
so it wasn’t a good time to have a milestone. So they moved it out a month… 
They ended up getting much more concerned about the cost ... We passed the 
milestone using the old electronics and they knew it was the old electronics. 
Ohm’s technical team had been concerned that they might not pass the second milestone 
because they had not fixed technical problems that the previous Pascal staff had voiced 
concerns about. However, the new Pascal staff prioritized the cost of production over 
functionality when they approved milestone two, demonstrating a price rather than 
technology oriented strategic focus for Pascal. 
If the established firm altered aspects of their strategy or product portfolio, their 
commitment to the partnership or their willingness to take risks on the new technology 
could change as well. While this could happen in either direction – a strategy shift could 
increase the importance of the entrepreneurial firm’s technology to the established firm or 
it could decrease the importance – in this data strategy shifts at the established firms only 
worked against the entrepreneurial firms. Coulomb had been working with a few Volt 
staff on a “paper study” of the economic impact of the new technology before they began 
conversations about contracting a formal partnership. Volt engineering and management 
were very excited at the potential Coulomb’s innovation posed for the firm and their 
industry, and they were motivated to be the first to have Coulomb’s machine. However, 
as the two firms got closer to finalizing their partnership contract, Volt became less 
willing to accept the risk of being the first to use the machine. As Coulomb CEO Jim 
Allen described, Volt was not worried about the new technology, they were worried 
about the risks of being the first test subject:  
People that know the design of the machines aren't worried about it meeting 
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spec, but that's not Volt's area... It's a big unknown for them… It being the first 
machine. 
As time passed, Volt’s team became more and more worried about the unknowns of the 
first machine and the risks that could mean to their productivity and bottom line. They 
became willing to accept less risk than they had been ready to take when they began 
contract negotiations. 
Established Firm Challenges to the Partnership 
If the established firm became misaligned from their entrepreneurial partner, they 
might shift the schedule and delay activities related to the partnership. In the event of a 
delay the established firm suffered no detriment; however, the entrepreneurial firm 
experienced a dangerous hold-up. The entrepreneurial firm was committed to working 
with this partner and had planned all of their activities and financial resources around this 
agreement. If the established firm delayed completing tasks or writing a check, the 
entrepreneurial firm could face an empty bank account. For example, after Pascal’s 
reorganization delayed the second milestone meeting, Ohm had to wait longer for their 
next funding installment.  
While Pascal’s reorganization only shifted their schedule by one month, Henry 
shifted their schedule with Ergon by significantly more. Ergon and Henry had agreed that 
Henry would have two years as Ergon’s exclusive U.S. manufacturer and distributor. 
When they began the partnership, the engineers in Henry’s manufacturing team worked 
well with Ergon’s engineers to insure the product design would be quickly ready for 
production. Then, the two years set aside for Henry’s exclusivity passed without Henry 
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assigning a lead to the sales team. As Ergon CEO Tad David described, Henry acquired 
another firm that was higher priority:  
Henry just acquired a very large company… It’s a $1.6 billion deal, which may 
not sound like a lot of money in the world of high tech, but in [our industry], 
that’s [a lot of] factories. [A lot of] new factories and hundreds of offices in the 
country would come with that acquisition. They want to integrate it all. There 
are multiple brands of products all coming into Henry now. These are the same 
people that are working with us. They’re dealing with that. 
While Henry’s delay may have been clearly explainable, Ergon was still left waiting 
more than two years for any action in U.S. sales of their product. As David explained the 
length of that delay meant Ergon was no longer required to remain exclusive with Henry: 
“Since they have not done that, arguably whatever rights they have in the agreement are 
no longer in place.” Yet, continued exclusivity or not, Ergon had lost two years in the US, 
their biggest market.  
Established firms that became misaligned from their entrepreneurial partners 
shifted not only their temporal priorities but also their strategic priorities. In a few 
instances, as their own strategies changed, the established firms became interested in 
different features or requirements for the technology. After Pascal’s reorganization, they 
reconsidered a number of their own product features, particularly regarding electrical 
efficiency. One such change was that they did not want any of their products to include a 
theta subcomponent. As Ohm Director of Engineering Development William Kerr 
explained, that meant Ohm had to remove the theta subcomponent from the first 
generation of their product:  
Pascal, with the reorg, they are forcing us to get rid of the [theta subcomponent]. 
Getting rid of the [theta subcomponent] for them pushes hitting very, very high 
efficiency to the fore. The problem is, we can see a path to very high efficiency 
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in [the current design] but it takes a lot of work and optimization is very 
complex… We’re confident that we can get there. It’s just getting there with the 
very first product. Originally, Ohm’s plan was to give Pascal a [product] that has 
a [theta subcomponent] in it. Maybe a year later we’d come out with the 
improved [no theta subcomponent design], but Pascal was basically saying, “We 
want the cake and we want it now.” 
Since Pascal was demanding a change in the design of Ohm’s product, they expanded the 
milestone schedule to make room for the additional work, as long as it was incorporated 
in the first generation of the product. However, they did not add to the funding that they 
contributed as part of the partnership. 
As in any partnership, a firm in these relationships could act opportunistically 
rather than honestly. In a small number of instances, established firm partners acted 
against the details of their partnership agreement with the entrepreneurial firm. In one 
challenge within this data, the established firm misrepresented (or perhaps outright lied 
about) agreed upon contractual details to external stakeholders. As the technology owner 
and the machine manufacturer, Coulomb and Foe carefully crafted how they would sell 
products to customers. They had agreed on a price for the purchase of the machine, which 
would be collected by Foe, and an ongoing technology licensing fee that would be paid to 
Coulomb. However, in one early interaction with a potential customer, Foe presented an 
entirely different sales proposal. As Coulomb CEO Jim Allen described, Foe ignored 
their agreement, proposed pricing more favorable to Foe, and attempted to shift the 
customer relationship dynamic:  
They basically are trying to sweep large overhead margins – all of their R&D 
costs, development costs and everything – into the final price that they are trying 
to force the first customer to pay. And so, that ends up doubling the cost… We 
dealt with that in the contracting by having a clear cost structure for them, but 
they just don't obey it. If we basically knew that their price was fixed, then at 
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least it leaves us with room to negotiate the licensing fee. But if they're going to 
charge whatever, if they think they can go to a customer and charge whatever 
they want, then suddenly we're really in conflict with them… It's clear they're 
trying to grab the long-term value in it, so I don't know exactly how it's going to 
go, but they keep trying to steal all of the customer relationships from us. They 
do all of these things that it's clear that they're trying to hustle us out, and take 
the long-term value. 
While Foe later claimed that they had understood the terms of their pricing agreement 
with Coulomb differently, the entrepreneurial firm, for whom only a small pool of 
customers existed, had to manage not only their misalignment with Foe but also 
correcting the numbers and relationship with this potential customer. 
Entrepreneurial Firm Strategies for Managing Established Firm Challenges 
When established firms took actions that challenged the partnership, the 
entrepreneurial firms used several managing strategies. These strategies were not 
exclusive, and an entrepreneurial firm could use multiple strategies simultaneously. The 
entrepreneurial firms in this study used four different strategies to manage the challenges 
their established firms initiated: 1) wait, 2) explore outside options, 3) resolve specific 
challenge content, or 4) address established firm’s motivation. Ultimately, an established 
firm challenge was resolved in one of two ways: the established firm realigned to the 
partnership or the entrepreneurial firm terminated the partnership. If the established firm 
realigned and the partnership continued, the firms might still face another challenge in the 
future that would be managed using the same set of strategies, as shown in Figure 6.  
Wait  
After the established firm took actions that challenged the partnership, the 
entrepreneurial firm could opt to simply wait for the established firm to return to their 
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prior state of alignment. The entrepreneurial firms in this study often used this strategy 
after the established firm shifted the schedule, which was the most common challenge 
experienced. When Henry had not assigned a lead to the sales team for distribution 
activities related to Ergon’s product, some people within the Ergon team wanted to take 
aggressive actions to motivate Henry. As Ergon CEO Tad David explained, he did not 
feel aggression or anger would lead to the best long term solution:  
I have some extremists on my board and in my company. They say, “The only 
way to get them to move is to poke them in the eye with, hey, we’re selling this 
thing against you with a different product.” Basically, show them that the market 
is happening and we’re selling it without them. That’s going to get them off 
their bus. I’m not so convinced. If I thought their issue was that they’re on this 
fence because they’re not sure the market is good, that would have been a very 
effective tool. I don’t think that’s what’s holding them back. I think what’s 
holding them back is that everybody is busy with a lot of different things. This is 
just one of a list of things to do. 
Since Henry had delayed past their exclusivity period, Ergon could have moved forward 
without their partner, but David still felt that working with Henry was the best strategy 
for the firm. Instead of ‘poking Henry in the eye’ David described his calculations for 
how long Ergon could wait for their partner before they would have to put the firm into 
“hibernation”: 
We will run out of money by the end of this calendar year if we don’t do 
something. If we just run as we go and don’t raise money, we will run out of 
money by the end of the year, give or take… By September – I’m not going to 
say September 1st, but somewhere in the month of September, something’s got 
to give… If something else gives, I’m going to have to send home half of my 
people and start pulling salaries for the other half. It’s going to get ugly. 
Waiting may not have been the preferred choice of some of Ergon’s board members, but 
David felt sure that the alternative strategies for the firm would never produce the 
revenue or value creation that waiting for Henry could achieve. 
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Explore Outside Options   
While the established firms in these partnerships had specified exclusivity, the 
entrepreneurial firms did have some outside options to explore in the event of a 
challenge. Rather than be paralyzed by hold-up, the entrepreneurial firms explored either 
sales options not excluded by their partnership contracts or began developing options that 
they could act on once their exclusivity period concluded. When Foe damaged both the 
trust Coulomb had in them and, potentially, Coulomb’s ability to profit from one in a 
small list of customers, the entrepreneurial firm began to look at their outside options. 
During a data collection interview after Foe’s disastrous customer meeting, Coulomb 
CEO Jim Allen kept gazing out the window at examples of an alternate product that he 
had begun to explore. He described the initial efforts that Coulomb was taking to 
understand this alternate market product:  
I've been eyeing the [alternate product visible from the window]. A lot of why 
[our] industry is hard is because [the products are large], and so we've been 
looking at things like [this alternate product], where we could build all of the 
equipment for a million dollars instead of the $10+ million. It's a totally 
different market then. We did a small consulting project with someone who 
designs and specs them, has worked with the manufacturers of them, and now 
works as a middleman between the manufacturers and the purchasers of them. 
We're figuring out the whole cost structure of the product and going in and 
doing analysis on the ground to figure out if we can replace that with our 
process. What would it look like? Then looking at features that we can pull off 
with our process that I can't do with the current process, and figuring out what 
the value add is of those. Basically just trying to work through all of the 
economics, to figure out if we think it's worth chasing. 
Because of their agreement with Foe, Coulomb could not find a replacement to their 
partner at that time, regardless of Foe’s behavior. What Coulomb could do was learn 
about alternate markets where they could apply their technology to bring in revenue, and 
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then, once they were no longer tethered to old commitments, they could return to their 
preferred market and try again. 
While changes in Pascal’s strategy and priorities incited challenges to the 
partnership at the second milestone, a worse challenge came with the fourth and last 
milestone. As Ohm’s CTO Al Marcone explained, the new team in the business unit at 
Pascal had different strategic priorities and significantly less incentive to approve Ohm’s 
technology and product: 
The problem is that the [reorganized milestone approval] team at Pascal has 
never been properly incentivized for this. All the risk is on them. The rewards 
are somewhere else. They’ve been motivated to kill it all along. 
After the new team added requirements and tests to the fourth milestone, Ohm began to 
consider whether they should launch a different product first. As Program Manager Sarah 
Ren explained:  
Because the core technology is so similar [in the alternate market product] and 
because we have total control over the product, we said: “Hey, maybe it makes 
sense for us to release [the alternate market product] so we can actually see 
some positive cash flow for once.” 
When Ohm wrote their partnership agreement with Pascal, they were clear that the 
entrepreneurial firm’s other product, which had already been under development, was not 
affected by Pascal’s exclusivity. The Pascal product had higher revenue potential and a 
larger market, but as Pascal dragged out their delay of the fourth milestone, Ohm began 
to explore whether less revenue was better than no revenue.  
Resolve specific challenge content  
As their first reaction to an established firm challenge, the entrepreneurial firms 
might also attempt to resolve the specific content of the challenge the established firm 
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had created. By seeking to correct the established firm’s action directly. When Pascal 
initially added certification requirements and tests to the fourth milestone of their 
partnership with Ohm, Ohm’s first reaction was to attempt to convince the Pascal team 
that the new specification requirements were not appropriate for Ohm’s technology. As 
Program Manager Sarah Ren explained: 
We tried to reason or try rationing with Pascal that it doesn’t quite make sense in 
today’s world, these specs just no longer make sense. Because it’s kind of a tech 
boss exercise that they do on their engineering team, in a sense that they weren’t 
really willing to compromise any of the specs. 
When that did not succeed, the Ohm team worked to correct any issue with their product 
design that might cause them to fail one of the tests. After a few failed test attempts, the 
Ohm engineering team flew to the Pascal office to identify the remaining fault in the 
design. Ohm CTO Al Marcone explained the efforts the team made, against unexpected 
resistance, to resolve the specific challenge content of the last product tests:  
What they were doing all of last year was running a slow game of attrition, 
whereby we’d have a prototype that was submitted for evaluation and, one at a 
time, they would identify a problem… “Look, we think we’re meeting all your 
specs, but we’re clearly not communicating properly. Every time we ship you 
something, you tell us it’s no good for X, Y or Z new reason that we’d never 
heard of before.” … From June to November, we’ve done this thing three 
times... They agreed that we would come out to their site and see all of the 
testing that they do, so we could have a conversation and get on the same page 
about what the true requirements were – because the real requirements were 
different than what their spec actually said. We went out there in December. 
That’s exactly what we thought we did. We went back and we made all the 
changes. In March, this year, we sent them this thing. We did everything they 
said we needed to do. I was like: “Finally, this thing is going to ship.” They get 
it and it gets sent back. They say, “It doesn’t work. It’s no good.” We say, “How 
can this be? Tell us what’s wrong.” What turned out to be the case was they 
didn’t show us the actual test that they did. There was a very fundamental 
difference between what they showed us, which was what we were already 
doing, by the way. We went back, scratching our heads. 
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In this instance, Ohm’s attempts to directly address the content of their fourth milestone 
challenge could not have succeeded since the Pascal team was acting against them. As 
was the case when other entrepreneurial firms tried this strategy, the established firm’s 
actions were less about the content of the challenge than they were about the 
misalignment of the firms. By directly addressing the specific content of the challenge, 
the entrepreneurial firm was not managing the true problem in the partnership. 
Address established firm’s motivation   
Since the challenging actions that the established firms took were precipitated by 
misalignment from the partnership, the managing strategy directed at the crux of the 
problem was to attempt to realign the established firm’s motivation. And yet, only one 
entrepreneurial firm in this study used this strategy, and for only one challenge. After 
Volt became more risk averse and delayed signing their partnership contract, Coulomb 
decided that rather than try to push Volt to sign, they should focus their efforts on 
regaining Volt’s commitment by allaying their increasing risk aversion. As Coulomb 
CEO Jim Allen explained the firm’s strategy: 
Volt finished all of their technical diligence and then we started sort of 
negotiating a deal and they said, "No," basically. It was too risky for them… The 
thing that we did, and we started the work in September… Basically we said, 
"We need a partner who already builds machine sort of like this." And then we 
talked to Volt and they were like, "Oh, yeah. If it's you partnered with a 
company that already builds machines like this then that's a very different 
proposal." 
Coulomb understood that what had changed for Volt was their strategic priorities around 
risk. To manage the challenge the partnership faced, the entrepreneurial firm decided that 
they need to realign Volt’s motivation to partner and their commitment to the technology. 
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If Volt’s worry was risk, then Coulomb would remind them of the value that they would 
gain by being first with the technology, and insure that their risks could be minimized. At 
completion of data collection, this managing strategy was ongoing. 
Established Firm Challenge Resolution 
During the partnerships, the entrepreneurial firms addressed a dozen challenges 
from their established firm partners. They managed these challenges through one or more 
strategies with the hope that they could realign the partnership and continue toward 
commercializing their technology products. In most cases, after using their managing 
strategies, the entrepreneurial firms found that their established firm partner did realign 
and the partnership continued. In two instances, the partnerships in this study did reach a 
different resolution in which the entrepreneurial firm terminated the partnership. 
Despite what seemed to some team members as an interminable wait, Ergon’s 
partner Henry did realign with the partnership following their schedule shift challenge. 
Once Henry’s business unit completed the assimilation of the newly acquired firm, Henry 
assigned someone to lead the sales team and begin work. As Ergon CEO Tad David 
described, while Ergon was still unclear on everything that had happened at Henry during 
the delay, the newly assigned sales lead was doing good work on the project:  
He has been given ownership of this. We don’t always have the inside track on 
exactly what are his incentives and what was promised to him and all of that. 
He’s doing it. He’s working at it hard. He’s good. He’s very competent. At this 
point, he’s very knowledgeable about the product, and not just the technical 
aspects of the product, but more importantly how the product matches and 
brings value to customers. Every [user] is a little different. He’s really now on 
top of all the nuances in value. 
Now realigned and with a new sales lead, Henry returned to the partnership and Ergon, 
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while no longer contractually held to exclusivity with Henry, continued to work only with 
their partner. 
Another option that the entrepreneurial firms had for resolution after their 
managing strategies was to choose to terminate the partnership. Within the data, 
entrepreneurial firms terminated two partnerships after they decided that they could not 
manage their partner or the challenges at hand within a time frame that the 
entrepreneurial firm could survive. After traveling to Pascal the second time and learning 
that they had not been shown the full testing apparatus, the Ohm team was discouraged 
and some members of the team began to suspect malicious intent on the part of Pascal. 
CTO Al Marcone described coming to realize how far misaligned their partner had 
become:  
We didn’t think at the time that there was some extra layer of subterfuge 
going… Some of it could be legitimate misunderstanding. Maybe they weren’t 
fully understanding what was expected when we went out there, at the engineer 
level. I feel like the senior engineer guy knew what was going on. He knew we 
didn’t understand X thing and he wasn’t going to help us understand it because 
it was going to help him kill the project. 
Once the Ohm engineers believed that they had been lied to, they stopped attempting to 
pass Pascal’s requirement tests. As Marcone described, the entrepreneurial firm decided 
that they had to go after their alternate market product or the firm would die:  
After that, I basically told [CEO Cam Fahey], “I’m not going to do anymore 
work on this thing for Pascal until we ship the [alternate product] because if we 
don’t ship that…” Cam agreed. She wanted me to still play nice with them, but I 
literally stopped talking to them – which was a little bit childish – but I felt that 
it was critical because it was dividing attention. There were too many things that 
needed to be pulled together for the [alternate product] to come off. … I said, 
“I’m physically unable to continue this charade. We need to do what we need to 
do to make the company successful. If we get back around to it, we’ll do the 
Pascal thing.” 
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After Ohm began sales of their alternate market product, the management team did restart 
conversations with Pascal. At that time, Pascal wanted to reassess the partnership and 
redefine the features and requirements of the product, to better align with Pascal’s latest 
product portfolio strategy. Ohm decided rather than renegotiate, they would terminate the 
relationship. After that decision, Ohm owed Pascal back the sum of the four instalments 
of capital that they had received during their two and a half year partnership. 
Navigating Challenges to Create Value 
In a successful partnership, the entrepreneurial firm completed development of 
their technology product, and the partners converted the option value of their partnership 
into a sales contract, or the established firm could have acquired the entrepreneurial firm. 
As of writing, two partnerships had converted to sales contracts but none of the 
entrepreneurial firms had been acquired. 
Conversion to a sales contract happened for two of the partnerships in this data, 
and only for one entrepreneurial firm: Ergon. At the time of writing, Bohr supplies Ergon 
their core chemical component which is then put into a separate module and delivered to 
Henry for inclusion in their manufactured product, which is currently available for sale in 
the US. Sales are ongoing and Ergon has received additional rounds of funding, primarily 
from angel equity investors. They have also received government grants and awards for 
advancements in global sustainability. In the summer of 2015, a consumer in Florida used 
a government grant to purchase the first Ergon-Henry product, from which Ergon 
collected extensive data that they used to improve future product performance. In January 
2017, Henry launched their own “game-changing solution” under a sub-brand they 
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owned and with “powered by Ergon” in large lettering on the machine. 
While termination of the partnership was neither the goal nor a fully positive 
outcome, the entrepreneurial firms that terminated did so with an outside option to create 
value. After Ohm’s experiences with Pascal during their fourth milestone, Ohm 
successfully launched and sold their alternate product to strong market reviews. One 
YouTuber who started his product review video eager to disprove Ohm’s core value 
proposition, its electrical efficiency, instead found himself dumbfounded exclaiming: 
“Wow. Okay, that is impressive…This thing is the real deal. I am quite impressed.” 
Critics from YouTube to industry press lauded Ohm in reviews that declared that the 
product had exceeded what was considered high efficiency for existing technologies by 
more than 17%, 4% higher than had been measured with any previous technology. With 
these reviews, Ohm was able to use their market and sales success with the alternate 
product to begin a new fund raising campaign after they terminated their partnership with 
Pascal. 
Partnering with the Right Established Firm 
Each of the partnerships began with motivated partners who saw value in their 
agreement and believed that their partnership was well structured to manage the 
entrepreneurial firm’s concerns about misappropriation and the established firm’s 
concerns about risk. However, as time passed and the established firms changed, the 
structure of the partnership was not enough to protect against established firm challenges. 
The entrepreneurial firms applied one or more of a set of strategies for managing those 
challenges, but ultimately it was the established firms that made the choices that returned 
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the partnerships to progress. While the entrepreneurial firms could choose to terminate 
the partnership, they had to rely on the established firm to continue moving forward. 
Surprisingly, the best outcomes for established firm challenge resolution and 
successful partnership came after an entrepreneurial firm opted to wait for their 
established firm partner. Perhaps less surprisingly, the least effective strategy for 
challenge resolution was to attempt to resolve the specific challenge content. Only one 
entrepreneurial firm attempted to address the established firm’s motivations as their 
strategy to manage and resolve a challenge, and that challenge was still awaiting 
resolution at the end of data collection. However, it may be worth noting that the 
established firm in that instance had restarted negotiations in response to the managing 
strategy employed. 
According to the literature, motivation to partner is key to success. To better 
understand the outcomes of these partnerships, I examined the strategic orientations of 
the established firms toward the value of the product and toward the processes of 
innovation and R&D, see Table 8. While all of the established firms entered these 
partnerships having concluded that they would not develop these technologies themselves 
at this time, they differed in regard to how strategically they valued the product under 
development and in their orientation and experience with innovation and R&D. Notably, 
Bohr and Henry, the two established firms that successfully converted the option value of 
their partnerships into sales contracts, both valued the product highly and valued 
innovation in their industry. Both firms had track records as innovators and were known 
to actively search for new technology products to adopt. Pascal, while also a firm that 
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valued innovation, was not known for new technology R&D and only valued Ohm’s 
technology as a non-core feature improvement to Pascal’s core products. Foe, in the 
reverse, had been exploring how to improve this very product when they met Coulomb, 
but the firm had no history of innovation and R&D, in fact they were surprised to learn 
Coulomb had a solution that could be patented. One conclusion that could be drawn from 
this is that for an established firm to  realign with this partnership structure after 
challenging it and to continue to a successful conclusion, that firm needed to see both a 
strategic value in the product and be oriented toward innovation and R&D themselves. 
Table 8: Established Firm Orientation toward Product Value and Innovation R&D 
EST Strategic Value of 
Product 
Orientation toward Innovation and 
R&D 
Partnership Status 
Pascal Non-core feature 
improvement 
Values Innovation, not known for radical 
R&D  
Terminated 
Foe Had been exploring prior 
to partnership 
Not R&D focused Terminated 
Volt Highly valued Not R&D focused  
(currently, previously was more so) 
In negotiations 
Bohr Highly valued Values Innovation, always looking for 
new technology products 
Option Converted 
to Sales Contract 
Henry Highly valued Values Innovation, actively looking for 
new products in their industry 
Option Converted 
to Sales Contract 
 
This is not to say that the active strategies, strategies other than to wait, that the 
entrepreneurial firms used to manage established firm challenges were not potentially 
effective for realigning their partners. Volt was an established firm that highly valued the 
product under development but was not innovation and R&D focused at this time in its 
history. While Coulomb’s strategy to address Volt’s motivations had not fully resolved at 
the end of data collection, Volt had returned to negotiations with Coulomb and 
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termination of the partnership was not under consideration by the entrepreneurial firm. 
One possible conclusion to be drawn from the state of this partnership is that when the 
established firm partner is not well oriented toward the product and innovation R&D, the 
entrepreneurial firm should focus on the strategy of addressing the established firm’s 
motivations in the event of an established firm challenge during the partnership. 
Discussion 
I examined how entrepreneurial firms developing new technologies managed 
partnering with established firms. Specifically, I focused on how the firms used option 
values to structure their partnerships, and how they then had to manage other challenges 
that structure invited. In designing their partnerships, the firms focused on managing each 
partner’s key concern. For the entrepreneurial firm at an early stage when its greatest 
value asset is its technology IP, they structured the partnership so that the entrepreneurial 
firm retained complete ownership and development control of their technology. For the 
established firm who did not want to risk much on uncertain technology but also did not 
want to be left behind by technology change, they exchanged an option value to first 
mover advantage in return for, relative to them, a small amount of financial resources and 
no equity or ownership of the entrepreneurial firm or its technology. However, while the 
partnership was structured to prepare against each firm’s key concerns, the design left 
open opportunities for misalignment and challenges. As time passed, the established 
firms who held only options for the future took actions that negatively impacted the 
partnership and the entrepreneurial firm. When such challenges arose, the entrepreneurial 
firms used one or more of four strategies to manage their partnerships: 1) wait, 2) explore 
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outside options, 3) resolve the specific challenge content, or 4) address the established 
firm’s motivations. These strategies resolved by either the established firm realigning to 
the partnership and activities resuming or the entrepreneurial firm terminating the 
relationship. Notably, in the partnerships that ultimately converted their option value into 
a sales contract, the established firm partners were previously oriented to value this 
technology product and innovation R&D while in the other partnerships the established 
firm only valued one of the two. 
This research contributes to our understanding of how entrepreneurial-established 
firm partnerships are executed as well as how they are structured. Prior research has 
examined the value of these partnerships to entrepreneurial firm success but has treated 
the partnerships as a somewhat standardized exchange of resources rather than a 
dynamic, co-opetitive interaction over time. Research on entrepreneurial-established firm 
alliances has primarily painted a picture of sequential interdependence in which the 
entrepreneurial firm performed R&D or discovery that was then handed to the established 
firm, often for manufacture and distribution (Pisano 1990; Lerner and Merges 2003).  In 
this model of exploitation alliances, the established firm has effectively outsourced their 
R&D to the entrepreneurial firm (Hill and Rothaermel 2003). Yet more recent research, 
such as Santos and Eisenhardt (2009) and Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009), has identified 
ways in which entrepreneurial firms have worked with established firm partners, not as 
providers of resources, but as co-creators defining the structures of nascent industries.  
In their study of the returns of interorganizational ties to entrepreneurial biotech 
firms, Gulati and Higgins (2002) found no effect on entrepreneurial firm IPO success 
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from strategic ties to established firms, which included established firms from both 
pharma and healthcare. I argue that to understand how partnerships between 
entrepreneurial and established firms affect the entrepreneurial firm and its technology 
development, we should not fuse together the variety of interorganizational relationships 
that these firms have. In Gulati and Higgins (2002), the strategic alliances within the data 
included ties to manufacturing and distribution partners as well as to customers, 
relationships that would have different structures, different goals, and different 
challenges. My findings point to both processes by which the entrepreneurial firms can 
affect the outcomes of their partnerships but also how characteristics of established firm 
partners limit or enable that success. Further, these findings demonstrate that failure of 
the partnership can still involve value creation by the entrepreneurial firm if that firm 
terminates the partnership and continues development of an outside option. 
This study continues a recent conversation in the entrepreneurship and alliances 
literature that focuses on the actions and power of the entrepreneurial firm in 
asymmetrical relationships. Recent work has shifted attention toward the entrepreneurial 
firm as an empowered actor making choices in their own interest: as the courted rather 
than the bought in acquisitions (Graebner and Eisenhardt 2004) and as the resource 
holder building ties (Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt 2008). Rather than viewing 
entrepreneurial technology firms as weak because of their limited financial resources, this 
study directs our attention to both the power these firms have as owners and developers 
of new technologies and the dependence that established firms have on them. While they 
are dependent on outside stakeholders for financial and other resources, these 
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entrepreneurial technology firms have managing strategies and alternatives by which they 
can affect their own firm’s fate. One such alternative touched upon here is the option 
value created for potential acquisition of the entrepreneurial firm by the established firm. 
Research has examined the tradeoff choice between whether to ally or to acquire 
(Higgins and Rodriguez 2006; Wang and Zajac 2007); however, less is understood about 
how alliances can be used as a first step toward acquisition, and how each firm can best 
manage that alliance for success after acquisition. Future research on option value 
structured entrepreneurial-established firm partnerships should explore the relationship 
between the partnership and any resulting acquisitions more fully. 
Work on disruptive innovations (Bower and Christensen 1995; Christensen 1997), 
and even work disputing that theory (King and Baatartogtokh 2015), has amplified the 
call for established technology firms to attend to new technology innovations under 
development at entrepreneurial firms. The established firms in the partnerships examined 
in this study appear to be doing just that. They are making decisions that are in line with 
their current strategies and markets while positioning themselves well for the possibility 
of technological change. Yet, the actions of these established firms point to the potential 
dangers, from the perspective of efficiently advancing the technology, of relying on 
partners whose motivations are for future potential outcomes. Within this study, one 
entrepreneurial firm, Coulomb, made progress toward realigning their established firm 
partner by addressing Volt’s motivation directly; however, in most instances, the 
entrepreneurial firm had little success actively realigning their partner. One recourse 
entrepreneurial firms could enlist as protection against opportunism and being held up by 
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the challenging actions of their established firm partners is to work within the 
frameworks of government or externally sponsored programs. Government programs 
such as ARPA-E and research consortia like Italian Societa di Ricerca support 
collaboration between entrepreneurial and established firms on technology R&D with 
both financial resources and structures that create barriers to opportunistic actions 
(Tripsas, Schrader, and Sobrero 1995). To a similar end, research in managing R&D has 
recommended that entrepreneurial firms partnering with established firms should have 
outside funding to create a buffer from hold-up and the challenges seen in this study 
(Aghion and Tirole 1994; Hellmann 2002). Additional research is needed to better 
understand how option value structured partnerships can be effectively managed even 
when the established firm is not an ideal partner. 
Limitations and Future Research 
As an inductive study of early stage entrepreneurial technology firms and their 
partnerships with established firms, this research encountered the challenge of data 
availability and access. All of the interview data collected for this research was collected 
through interviews with team members at the entrepreneurial firms. No access was 
attained for interviews with team members at the established firms. Information about the 
established firms, their strategies and motives, are taken from statements made by 
informants at the entrepreneurial firms on information said or given to them and from 
documents internal to the entrepreneurial firm or publically available. Future research 
that continues to explore these option value structured partnerships between 
entrepreneurial and established firms would ideally include informants from firms on 
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both sides. 
Additionally, the set of five partnerships studied here include only three 
entrepreneurial firms from within the energy and cleantech sector. In the period during 
which this data was collected the energy and cleantech sector experienced a significant 
negative shift in the funding climate for entrepreneurial firms, especially for those firms 
in their early stages (Saha and Muro 2017). Additional studies are needed to better 
understand how option value structured partnerships are used across other sectors in 
which entrepreneurial firms are doing new technology development but may face a 
different funding environment. 
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the research in this dissertation contributes to our understanding of early 
stage entrepreneurial technology firms, it has clear limitations. The firms studied here 
were all developing new technology knowledge into novel hardware innovations. In my 
research design, I specifically chose to study firms facing the high uncertainty of going 
from lab or theory to market with hardware products for several reasons. First, because 
these firms are developing new technology knowledge that has never been 
commercialized or manufactured at market scale, their development teams were likely to 
face previously unknowable challenges directly related to their core science and 
technology. This fundamental technology uncertainty increased the likelihood that these 
firms would experience technology development challenges that could trigger them to 
consider strategic change and therefore increase the likelihood that I, as researcher, would 
observe this process. Secondly, within the technology innovation and entrepreneurship 
literatures, research has focused more on entrepreneurial technology firms developing 
software products, which have faster and less capital intensive development processes. 
While this research design allowed me to extend our understanding of technology 
entrepreneurship, these very differences could also limit the generalizability of these 
findings to other entrepreneurial technology firms. Further research would be necessary 
to directly compare the two contexts and fully understand the boundary conditions 
between them.  
As an inductive study of early stage entrepreneurial technology firms, this 
research encountered the challenge of data availability and access. All of the interview 
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data collected for this research was collected through interviews with team members at 
the entrepreneurial firms. With only two exceptions, no access was attained for 
interviews with outside stakeholders such as investors or team members at the established 
firms that partnered with the entrepreneurial firms studied. Information about investors 
and established firms partners were taken from statements made by informants at the 
entrepreneurial firms from information said or given to them and from documents 
internal to the entrepreneurial firm or publically available. In future research, additional 
access to stakeholders beyond the boundaries of the entrepreneurial firms would ideally 
include informants from those entities. 
Additionally, the seven entrepreneurial firms studied here are all from within the 
energy and cleantech sector. In the period during which this data was collected the energy 
and cleantech sector experienced a significant negative shift in the funding climate for 
entrepreneurial firms, especially for those firms in their early stages (Hargadon and 
Kenney 2012; Saha and Muro 2017; Mowery, Nelson, and Martin 2010). This aspect of 
the funding environment increased the financial uncertainty these firms experienced, and 
therefore the opportunity to study how the firms managed those challenges. However, it 
also meant that the firms studied here were less likely to participate in more traditional 
venture capital and equity funding. Additional studies would be needed to better 
understand how these findings might differ for entrepreneurial firms facing a different 
funding environment.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Decisions get solidified and then we plan for that.  And then things change, and 
we have to change our path, but we still have to decide on what we are doing. 
      -- Gauss Co-Founder & Chief Engineer 
 
Entrepreneurship is idiosyncratic, so much about each firm and founding is 
unique. One consistent theme is uncertainty: entrepreneurial firms must build themselves, 
their strategies, and their products through uncertainty. For entrepreneurial firms 
developing novel innovations from new technology knowledge, this is amplified. In their 
first talks with potential investors, Ohm had their situation incisively summarized by a 
VC who was clearly not going to write them a check any time soon: “You are startup 
squared.” Uncertainty is at the foundation of the biggest questions entrepreneurial 
technology firms face: Will the technology work? Do we have product-market fit? Do we 
have the right strategy? How can we get the resources to bring this to market and 
appropriate a profit from our efforts?  
My goal with this dissertation was to examine how these ‘startup squared’ firms 
manage the uncertainties they face from a very early stage of their firm and their 
technology. I designed my longitudinal field study to maximize the opportunity to 
observe this by focusing on very early stage firms developing new technology knowledge 
that had previously only existed in a lab into a novel hardware innovation. In my 
interviews with team members at these firms, I focused on their strategic decisions to 
capture how they managed their strategy and technology development in the face of 
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uncertainty and how they handled the realization when they had been wrong about some 
uncertainty. From this data, I was able to examine three key processes for entrepreneurial 
firms: changing, learning, and getting assistance. 
In the first paper, I delved into how these firms manage uncertainty through 
strategic change, specifically a pivot. Drawing from the literature on strategic change, I 
defined a pivot as a change in a firm’s strategy that reorients the firm’s strategic direction 
through a reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, and attention. I found that 
the firms managed their strategies under uncertainty with beliefs about what they did not 
know. After new information triggered them to consider strategic change, they only chose 
to change when they found those beliefs either in conflict with a problem or expanded by 
an opportunity. Most often, they retained their beliefs throughout their decision making 
process and chose not to change their strategy. Despite their own expectations that they 
would pivot if they learned that their strategy was wrong, the firms that did pivot did so 
through an accumulation of independently triggered decisions that each added or exited 
an element of the firm’s strategy as their beliefs were affected. 
In the second paper, I examined how these firms learned about their uncertain 
context through decision making when they chose not to change their strategy. Our 
understanding of learning has focused on how firms change as a result of learning, but in 
a dynamic and uncertain context, a firm may learn that they should not change. I found 
that since they faced uncertainty, new learning could improve accuracy or add details to 
their knowledge and either support or oppose the assumptions they believed. Using their 
new, revised knowledge during decision making allowed them to clarify their goals, 
  
146 
reassess strategy tradeoffs, and fill execution gaps in their activities, which did not 
necessarily lead to the decision to change their strategy. Instead, as they learned about 
their uncertainties, the firms chose what not to do or how to adjust to improve their 
current strategy. 
In the third paper, I examined how entrepreneurial firms developing novel 
innovations from new technology knowledge manage the challenges of partnering under 
high uncertainty with established firms. Entrepreneurial firms can mitigate some of the 
uncertainty they face through partnerships with established firms; however, they then 
need to manage those relationships from a position of low power. While the 
entrepreneurial firms bring the linchpin technology content to these partnerships, the 
established firms power retain more power as holders of financial resources, 
complementary assets, and current market power. I found that these firms designed their 
partnership contracts around each firm’s key concerns: misappropriation of IP for the 
entrepreneurial firm and risk for the established firm. When their established firm 
partners became misaligned and took actions that challenged the partnership, the 
entrepreneurial firms used one or more of four strategies: 1) wait, 2) explore outside 
options, 3) resolve specific challenge content, and 4) address the established firm’s 
motivations. The result of these managing strategies was either that the established firm 
realigned its commitment to the partnership or the entrepreneurial firm terminated the 
relationship. 
Entrepreneurship is at its core a process of building a firm under uncertainty. 
Using the data from this longitudinal field study of seven firms attempting to do just that, 
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I believe this dissertation contributes to our understanding of how entrepreneurial firms 
developing new knowledge into novel technology innovations manage uncertainty 
through strategic change, learning, and getting assistance. 
 
“Uncertainty is a quality to be cherished, therefore – if not for it, who would 
dare to undertake anything?”        ― Villiers de L'Isle-Adam 
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